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| Solving the problem of identity in the era of globalisation |
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Secularism and the capitalist economic system should have become the sole basis of defining identity, and not just the philosophical system in solving human problems. Yet despite this disparity, western thinkers celebrate this achievement as bringing Europe out of the Dark Ages, which is not wholly accurate. While the capitalist ideology elevated the standard of living and precipitated scientific and technological progress - while it liberated Europe from the emotional belief in Christianity - it still maintained the emotional belief in nationalism, which is rather ironic when western civilisation prides itself upon rational and scientific thought. Indeed I argue that Europe still hasn't emerged out of the Dark Ages because nationalism is wholly irrational just as Christianity is viewed as irrational and superstitious. This is just one aspect as to why Europe failed to achieve the correct revival, which is a discussion that will be explored in the near future. Therefore, instead of rational thinking obliterating nationalism as a basis of identity we find this destructive force intellectualised into a discussion about the modernity of nationalism, at the same time the Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment began to liberate people from religious superstition culminating in the British rebellion against the monarchy, the eighteenth century struggles in the New World and the French revolution. Out of this climate of intellectual and political revolution the modern nation state was born in Europe in 1648 with the treaty of Westphalia, which is why scholars say that the discourse of nationalism is distinctly modern. Eric Hobsbawm and Best say:
"The basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is modernity,"
"Historians of nationalism agree to differ in their estimates of how much of it (and what sorts of it) already existed in the Atlantic world of 1785. They are at one in recognising that that world by 1815 was full of it, and that although each national variety had of course its strong characteristics, those varieties had enough in common for it constitute the most momentous phenomenon of modern history."
As a consequence nationalism evolved from an emotional manifestation of the survival instinct into a political philosophy, the German philosopher Herder and the French philosopher Augustin Barruel conceived its essential principles, which would ultimately shape European and global politics to the present day. The French revolution of 1789 symbolised this new thinking as the people rose up in the name of the French nation inspired by the treatise of popular self-government by Jean-Jacques Rousseau:
"The Revolution unified France and enhanced the power of the national state. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars tore down the ancient structure of Europe, hastened the advent of nationalism, and inaugurated the era of modern, total warfare."
As a result nationalism became synonymous with secular philosophy. Here we need to ask ourselves the question, how is it possible that a civilisation that prides itself upon rational thought adopts nationalism as part of its identity which in principle is no different to the emotional belief in Christian doctrine? Indeed how is this possible when people have no choice over their ethnicity? In principle it's not much different to the papacy's evocation that people were destined to be poor and should be content with it.
When we examine these questions it becomes quite clear that secularism doesn't provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of identity that would bring contentment, rather secularism in origin left the deeper question of identity to the individual i.e. where do we come from, what comes after death and the relationship of this life with what came before and what will come after to the individual. This presents a problem to governments in how they build the strong emotional relationships between the people and state because secularism alone is not sufficient in achieving such loyalty, which is proven in times of war, when governments need to motivate the people to fight and defend the land. As a result we find a dangerous philosophical pragmatism on part of western philosophers and the ruling elites who adopt nationalism as a basis of seizing and legitimising their hold on power. Consequently those scholars such as Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson who argue that nations are a socially constructed phenomenon - imagined communities - holds some semblance of truth because we find that governments have to find new ways to build loyalty to the state and maintain power for the ruling factions in society:
"Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist."
If secularists who pride themselves upon rationality follow the subject of identity to its logical end then secularism and not nationalism should be the sole basis of defining a people's identity. This alone should eliminate the artificial borders that exist between secular states. But this is an inevitable disparity we find in western civilisation, and which can be observed in the European Union; although every European nation is secular we find that they remain divided because the ruling elites across Europe are worried about their power and influence. They are debating whether their influence can be achieved through a Federal Europe or by maintaining the sovereignty of the nation state. We also find that secularism hasn't resolved racist prejudices, which is evident amongst many Europeans who are resistant to Turkey's membership of the European Union. The problems of European integration symbolise how secular political culture cannot adequately solve the problem of identity let alone create an identity that transcends language and race. On the contrary we find that Europe's political institutions perpetuate nationalism by recognising nation states. As a result we find a dangerous philosophical, and political pragmatism, which sees the western elites redefining the identity of the state in an irrational context because the ruling elites seek to maintain their power while the intellectual classes recognise that modern nationalism is no longer viable in multiethnic societies. Anthony Giddens reflects this confused thinking:
"By a 'nation’ I refer to a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states."
This is further evidenced when Trevor Philips, head of the Commission for Racial Equality said that Britain "must scrap multiculturalism." While Western thinkers are recognising some of the philosophical disparities, there needs to be a deeper recognition that secular philosophy at its roots and branches is unable to create an identity that isn't infected by the scourge of nationalism. Globalisation magnifies the intellectual contradictions, which are also reflected in the discussions at the Foreign Policy Centre:
"What are British Values - and will they help us make these decisions? When conflicts arise, the political class searches for ties that bind. Both David Blunkett and Peter Hain recently declared that immigrants need to be 'more British' - but their invocation of 'British values' merely highlighted the extent to which there is confusion about the content of British identity."
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