Akmal Asghar

In December 2010, China was heavily condemned for its failure to allow democracy activist Liu Xiaobo to attend to collect the Nobel Peace Prize. The western media, contrasting its spectacular economic growth through its adoption of state capitalism with its slow progress on political reforms and ‘human rights’, examined China’s record on ‘human rights’ and found it wanting. Similar judgements are often made about Muslim countries and, increasingly, about Islam itself.

There is little dispute that oppression exists in China, just as it is widespread in the Muslim world. The track record of repression, state violence and abuse is common across many Muslim countries, all of which are increasingly paying the penalty for their state-sponsored brutality. The question about Islam’s compatibility with human rights has no relation to the actions of regimes in Muslim countries. Some of these states employ Islamic language to cover their actions, and even argue their autocracy is Islamic. Yet there is little Muslims recognise as Islamic in their actions. Therefore, the relationship between Islam and ‘human rights’ needs to examined separately.

Are these rights ‘universal’ or ‘western’?

What are these ‘rights’ against which Islam is usually measured? Who or what is responsible for their definition? The term ‘Universal Human Rights’ is a bold assertion that suggests these rights are so basic, universal and self-evident that they can be associated with the very basic value of being human.

The fact that some of these rights are seen as a global norm and the lens, through which all other values, cultures and belief systems have come to be measured, must be distinguished from true universality.
The truth is that many of these late twentieth century ‘human rights’ have their origins in a belief system that emerged from Europe’s particular history and culture (and those of its migrant ‘pilgrim fathers’ who settled in North America). That many of these rights have become a global benchmark says more for the force that has established them as such, than for the intellectual coherence or universality of the rights themselves.

The principle document through which these human rights have come to be articulated is the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Much of this document is so broad and generic that many communities across the world, including Muslim, find within it aspects that resonate with their own beliefs and political concerns.

But clear lines of tension have evidently arisen with Islam, such that traditional Islamic beliefs are now considered contrary to these rights. Consequently proponents of the UDHR and human rights more generally now deem adherence to these beliefs and practices problematic and attempts have subsequently emerged to reform or re-read the Islamic beliefs and rules in a way that is more compatible with these ‘modern’ rights. Religious freedom, women’s rights, corporal and capital punishment are amongst the principle lines of conflict for western commentators.

But before considering these conflict points, it is important to note that the context and origin of the rights expressed in the UDHR reveal a very particular not universal character.

Historically, the forerunners to this document were the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776 and ‘déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen’ of 1789, both of which were recognised at key moments in western European and American history. The assumed importance of the UN’s declaration is partly based on the historical context associated with its publication, this being the end of the second major war of the 20th century and the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Earlier attempts to articulate a set of ‘human rights’ in the west also aimed to safeguard rights in part to deal with the excesses of colonialism, capitalism and imperialism and the injustice they had unleashed at historical junctures. The intellectual heritage of these rights also follows a western course, as they are closely associated with secularism, liberty as described by liberal thinkers and democracy. In sum, these rights are the output from a western historical, political and intellectual experience.

Gender equality – Europe playing catch up

The notion of gender equality, for example, has a meaning peculiar to the treatment of women in western history. Considering women and men equally human may have been significant for a continent that considered women sub-human or ‘evil witches’. But this cannot be said for Islam for example, which had long elevated the status and rights afforded to women to provide centuries of social and familial cohesion.

The ‘different’ responsibilities articulated by Islam, simplistically judged unequal by the west, have been at the heart of a balanced community, affording women economic and political rights in a system that has a different arrangement between rights, responsibilities, family and society to the simplistic standardisation the west now finds frustratingly unachievable.  Much more can be said, but it is worth asking that if the arrangement Islam promotes between men and women for social tranquillity is so obviously wrong, why is it that amongst the largest number of embracers of Islam in recent years have been western, middle class, educated women, all of whom are best placed to benefit from the west’s ‘advances’ in equality? [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article7135026.ece ]

Protecting different religions: Islam or Secular Europe?

Religious freedom too has a particular relevance in the context of religious and sectarian persecution that was rampant in Europe during the Middle Ages. In this context, the emergence of a political consensus to separate religion from state served to diffuse religious tensions whilst allowing communities to continue to adhere to their beliefs albeit in a personal capacity. Again Islam and the experience of Muslims is quite different, and whilst there have been notable conflicts in Islam’s long history, its history is not characterised by centuries of internal religious wars whether with Muslims or with other religious communities.

History also points to religious tolerance, non-Muslim communities seeking sanctuary under Islam and flourishing communities such as those in Spain.

Rights for all citizens

This is because in Islam, the Shari‘ah works to protect the life, honour, blood, property, belief, race and mind of all citizens.

The state, in Islam, known as the Khilafah (Caliphate), also enshrines the concept of citizenship, and rejects discrimination of treatment on the basis of belief, let-alone insulting other beliefs in the name of celebrating an abstract freedom. The latter also points to the specificity of religious freedom to the west where, almost exclusively, insulting or mocking religion is considered a right. For most non-western communities, this is extremely odd and cannot be understood outside of the west’s very specific historical context and experience with religion.

Which comes first: rights or interests?

The issues of corporal and capital punishments remains contentious even with western states, as some continue to institute corporal punishment and the death penalty in their penal codes, despite signing-up to the UDHR and taking every opportunity to chastise others who fail to uphold other aspects of the UDHR.

The west’s own limited commitment to these rights has not gone amiss amongst non-western populations over the past few years. Despite attempts at moral superiority, the use of torture and denial of legal rights in the aftermath of 9/11 have emerged as a very bloody stain.  So has the west’s support for regimes that utterly fail on measures of its own human rights requirements.

It would appear these universal human ‘rights’ are consistently secondary to ‘interests’, and so while there is a declared commitment to securing these rights, this actual commitment can be seen to quickly fall away when more vital economic or political interests are at stake. These rights are therefore a function of more fundamental considerations and not rights in the real, intellectual sense of the word: they are neither guaranteed nor sufficiently prioritised, despite being described as a fundamental part of being ‘human’.

Islam’s distinct view

Islam has its own view on rights, the basis of which has already been briefly mentioned: the protection of life, honour, blood, property, belief, race and the mind.

These acquire the quality of constancy because they are considered fundamental, more so than interests – something that is a true quality of ‘rights’.

The value, nature and priority of the rights does not suffer from the specific historical context that undermine the west’s attempts at projecting its experience as the template for change and progress for the rest of the world.
So when Islam declared torture prohibited, it did so unequivocally at all times and places. Furthermore, when murder was made a capital offence in Islam, the Quran mentions that Qisas was to save life:
“And there is life for you Qisas (the law of retaliation), O men of understanding, that you may ward off (evil).” [TMQ Al-Baqara:179]

It is also important to note that whereas in Europe, intellectuals argued that individuals were sovereign and consequently individual liberty trumped all, Islam recognised the collective as having rights that too needed to be protected, not jeopardised through the actions of a few individuals.

This was eloquently explained in a famous saying of the Messenger of Allah (saw) in his, Hadith As-Safeena, “The example of the one who stands for the Deen of Allah and the one who has left it are like the people in a boat, some of whom occupy the upper deck and some occupy the lower deck. Whenever those in the lower deck need water, they have to go to the upper deck to retrieve it. So some of them said, ‘why don’t we make a hole in our deck so we do not harm the people of the upper deck?’ If the people do not stop them, they will all fall and be failures, but if they stop them they will all be saved” [Bukhari]

In sum, Islam has its own distinct view on rights, but so does it on the values and commitment to these rights, which are not subject to serious alterations when they simply become unpopular or threaten state economic interests.