New Civilisation Magazine Islamic Political Thinking home > contact Us > about us >
  January 06 2009 12.22 gmt
  Current Issue
 
  Join Our Newsletter
    
Please Select sub-criteria
  
Accountability without Western Democracy 04
  
       
   The Separation of the Authoritative and the Authoritarian in Early Islam

From the time of the Prophet to the end of the Rashideen Caliphs the 'persuasive authority' (in light of textual evidence) and 'coercive authority' (in the sense of state enforcement capabilities) were one. Each of the Caliphs was competent to give legal opinions (as scholars of jurisprudence) with regards to issues pertaining to all aspects of life. However, they did not attempt to adopt legal opinions for every issue and enforce them on the public. In particular, issues pertaining to personal worships were left for individuals to find their own 'persuasive authority'. They would adopt and enforce their opinion in issues that were imperative for the smooth running of the state and had to be obeyed with the understanding of the Shari'ah principle: "The order of the ruler settles the difference." [30]

The Umayyads attempted to combine juristic interpretation and ruling as their sole right, claiming this was the practice of the Rashideen Caliphs. However, towards the latter part of the Umayyad period, the jurists asserted clearly that interpretative authority of the Islamic legal texts was not the sole right of the ruler.The legal schools of thought (madhahib) were formulated and new vigour for interpretation and ijtihad was found based on the legal schools' foundations (usul). [31]

This continued into the era of the Abbasid Caliphate, where there was a clear distinction between the 'coercive authority' of the Caliphs and their need for the 'persuasive authority' of the scholars. As a result there was some degree of accounting from the 'an authority' of the 'in authority'. The Caliphs patronised some scholars for legitimacy and other prominent scholars were occasionally imprisoned for their opposition and refusal to take offices offered by the Caliphs. [32]

The Ulema (Scholars) were increasingly seen as the guardians of the original message of the Qur'an and Prophetic Sunnah and this was solidified in the minds of the Ummah with the expansion and development of Islamic jurisprudence. The constant referencing to the 'combined text' of the Qur'an and Hadith lead to an increase in the corpus of Islamic law (fiqh).The development of principles of Ijma' (consensus) and Qiyas (analogical deductions in reference to the Text) further aided the jurists to deal with increasingly complex issues, including those of governance. [33]

While the scholars were respectful of the Caliphs and preached obedience, they were clear that the law was their province and it was theoretically binding on the Caliphs and their subjects. [34] The scholars enjoyed a significant degree of independence in expressing opinions as long as they could back it up from authoritative sources.This is in stark contrast with the European experience of the past, where the Christians subjected the law of the Church to the whims of the ruler by endowing the king with a divine right over the people. The clergy was given the monopoly to interpret the divine law for the king. This lead to various excesses from both king and Church, such as issuing 'pardon cheques', excommunicating opponents, and burdensome taxes on the general public.This 'partnership of authority' in history is seen as the evidence of the tendency to authoritarianism of religious politics. [35]

Accountability in the Islamic Political System

Muslims generally accept that the common political function of looking after people's affairs is the responsibility of the Ummah, because the Qur'an addresses the Ummah at large, not the ruler. However, because the Ummah cannot act as one individual, it has to delegate its authority to one individual, the ruler, who is still theoretically subordinate to the Ummah.The original right to rule therefore is that of the Ummah, and the ruler is an executive agent. [36]

The scholars of Islam, who are legal experts, understood that the obedience to any ruler commanded in the Qur'an [37] is conditional upon those rulers being subservient to the sovereignty of the Shari'ah (The Qur'an and the Sunnah) and any disputes with such rulers should be judged according to the Shari'ah. Hence, they made it their job to meticulously scrutinise and account the actions of the ruler in terms of congruity to the Shari'ah.Any complaint during the time of the Prophet's ruling and subsequently by the Rashideen Caliphs with regards to 'acts of injustice' (Mazlema) perpetrated by the state against the people, which could include the ruler, was investigated. This subsequently developed into the post of Qadi Al-Mazaalim (Judge of the Unjust Acts) during the Abbasid period and he was responsible for looking into complaints of the people against the ruler. [38] This restricts the ruler from abusing his power and prevents authoritarianism.

Indeed, accounting the ruler is seen as one of the noblest activities a Muslim could be engaged in and it falls under the broad category of the duty of 'Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong'. [39] As is stated in the Qur'an:

"Let there arise a group amongst you that call to the Good, commanding the right and forbidding the wrong; those are the successful" (TMQ 3:104) [40]

The Prophet has also stated in relation to accounting the ruler:"The best jihad is a word of truth in the presence of an unjust ruler" [41] and also "The Master of Martyrs is Hamza, and a man who stood up to a tyrant ruler to advise him and was killed." [42]

These Hadith of the Prophet implicitly recognise that rulers are ultimately human and can therefore be unjust, despite being chosen for the best of their qualities. But injustice on behalf of the ruler does not absolve the Muslim of the duty of accounting the ruler, whether as an individual or collectively in political parties. The Qur'anic verse mentioned above indicates the formation of such political parties as an additional mechanism of accounting the ruler.

  
       
   « First  <  2 3 4 5 >
Page 4 of 5 pages