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| Egyptian Elections: Painful LessonsEgyptian Elections: Painful Lessons |
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After welcoming the amendment but demanding that the regime go further, the opposition became extremely critical due to the conditions imposed on independent candidates who wished to stand in the presidential elections.Whoever wished to stand as an independent candidate (i.e. not belonging to a legal political party) had to request the support of parliament, regional councils, the municipalities and the villages. This was an impossible task for any independent candidate due to the domination of the councils at all levels of governance by NDP members. This condition immediately prevented potential independent candidates such as the Egyptian feminist Dr Nawal Al Sa'dawi and the democratic activist Dr Sa'd Al Din Ibrahim from entering the presidential race. Importantly it prevented the MB from putting forward their independent candidate to contest the presidential elections. There is no doubt that Mubarak feared the competition he would face from the MB so the restrictive conditions were a way in which he could maintain his position without any significant threat. Many political parties refused to present a candidate due to these restrictions, with only credible opposition such as the Al Ghad party and Al Wafd party putting forward candidates.The presidential elections on the 7th of September resulted in Mubarak winning 88.6 % of the votes, Ayman Nour of the Al Ghad party is estimated to have received 7.3 % of the vote and Numan Gumaa of the Al Wafd party received 2.8 % of the votes. Electoral turnout was low in both rural and urban areas, approximately 15% in the countryside and between 3-5% in the cities. The foregone conclusion contributed to the low turnout and the lack of real competition.The Al Ghad and Al Wafd parties lack the capacity for grassroots mobilisation, since their support is largely confined to a secular educated class - in contrast to the MB which has an extensive support base but as mentioned was not able to put forward a candidate.The turnout would have been boosted if the MB had been able to present a candidate, due to the MB's strong affiliation with the people and their political skill in mobilisation. In addition to an uncompetitive election, there was evidence of vote buying, violence, intimidation and media bias. Independent monitors were not given access to polling stations, representatives of political parties were not allowed into polling stations and buses were organised by the regime to bring people to vote in favour of Mubarak (Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights, 10/09/05). The presidential election therefore suffered from irregularities and was indicative of the desire of an autocrat to remain in power under the aura of cosmetic change. Despite the internal and regional criticism that emerged after the presidential elections, Karen Hughes, visiting US undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, was full of praise. She stated that the elections provided 'opportunities to all presidential candidates to freely explain their platforms in the media'. This statement contradicted reality as candidates faced media bias and their campaign advertisements were prevented from being aired on Egyptian TV. Karen Hughes's statement was clearly out of touch with what had happened on the ground, raising doubts over US sincerity about democratisation in Egypt. However the real test of US and Egyptian commitment would be the ensuing parliamentary elections in November.
Parliamentary elections
Demonstrations and rallies have been a common occurrence for the last year, with demonstrators calling for expansion in political freedoms, an end to the state of emergency and end to the NDP monopolisation of power. The voice of the opposition had risen against an autocratic system, which had mastered the art of silencing political dissent. An aura of optimism was present leading up to the parliamentary elections, something which could not be said of previous parliamentary elections. To make the most of the situation, the opposition formed a coalition of 10 parties to present a single list of candidates to contest the parliamentary elections. The MB was part of this coalition and offered to co-operate in order to ensure the coalition made maximum gains. However, it did not put forward candidates to be part of the single list, claiming that having chosen its candidates months before, there was insufficient time to discuss a platform and agenda with the other parties.Therefore the MB decided to opt for an opportunistic policy of collusion, which they hoped would build bridges with the secular opposition; but at the same time they decided to present their own list of candidates to increase MB representation and influence in the legislative assembly. The MB confidently forecast big gains, predicting approximately 70-100 MB candidates would enter the new legislative assembly.This was a marked contrast from previous parliamentary campaigns, where the state would engage in a mass campaign of arrests and harassment of MB members prior to the elections. The behaviour of the state towards the MB was thus unusual; political commentators accused the MB of forging a deal of mutual benefit with the state.They claimed the deal was that the MB would not to engage in criticism of Hosni Mubarak or his close associates; in return the state would not engage in a campaign of terror against MB members and supporters (Al-Ahram 17-23rd November, 2005). These accusations became more prominent in the lead-up to the first round of elections.The MB candidates were allowed to campaign under their own party banner, use their traditional slogan of 'Islam is the Solution' and act without harassment from the security apparatus. This was seen as a watershed in the relations between the MB and the state. However, questions remained as to whether the state would stick to its side of the bargain and not interfere with the MB, or with the rest of the opposition.
The first round of elections was an improvement from previous campaigns but was still witnessed the occurrence of violence, vote buying and harassment from the security services in certain constituencies. Mona El Tahawy, a columnist for the London based pan-Arab newspaper Asharq al Awsat, called Ayman Nour's defeat in his constituency of Bab el Shariyya in Cairo a clear illustration of the state's desire to cling to power and prevent competitors from challenging its hegemony.The performance of the secular opposition was poor - they only gained 6 seats while the MB gained 34. This was a massive increase from the legislative elections in 2000 where they had only gained 17 seats. The poor state of the secular opposition was clear; in contrast the strength of the MB was clear as well. The MB's strong showing troubled Washington as much as Mubarak, due to its continual fear of Islamists reaching power in the Middle East.The second round of elections on the 20th of November was marked by an escalation of state violence and harassment, especially of MB supporters, with approximately 600 being arrested. This state intrusion was indicative of the collapse of any deal which had been forged previously -fearing further gains,it resorted to draconian tactics to subdue the performance of the MB. Despite state aggression the MB fared well, gaining 13 seats and 29 extra seats in the run offs - indicating the power of the MB in Egyptian society. This raised MB representation to 76 in the legislative assembly.The 3rd round of elections was characterised by even more arrests of MB members and activists, with approximately 1,500 being detained by state security forces. In this round the MB gained no seats but attained 12 through the run offs, raising MB representation to 88 seats, approximately 20% of seats in the 444 seat legislative assembly. There is no doubt that if the elections were contested freely the MB could have raised their representation to 100 seats at least. It was this fear that led the Egyptian state to use repressive tactics towards them.The world media criticised the manner in which the elections were conducted, with an autocratic state applying naked coercion to retain its hold on power. The question remained however, how would the US respond to the events?
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