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| The Challenges Facing Hamas |
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The indications are that Hamas is willing to negotiate on its public base position, even if the party secretly continues to believe that Israel has no right to occupy Palestinian land. Various factors lend themselves to this view. Many of the old guard are gone; influential and powerful figureheads such as the spiritual founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his successor Dr Al-Rantissi among them. Moreover, there are Islamic scholars who may be willing to give Hamas their blessing, were it to pursue such a course of action. Notable amongst these is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an instantly recognisable face on the Arab street, who has often defended the right of Hamas and others to use violence within the context of the Israeli/Palestinian scenario. It is also highly unlikely that Hamas would have been politically naïve enough to participate in the elections without possessing at least a semi-coherent game plan. Knowing that a win in the elections would have left them in precisely the quandary they are now faced with, the suspicion must be that a compromise of sorts was to be expected – a protracted and drawn out compromise it may be, but nevertheless, a distinct break from the traditional stance.
This, after all, is the only realistic option available. Having decided to engage in the political process, Hamas could not have expected to take over governance of the shattered Palestinian territories whilst remaining true to its ideals and principles of a sustained material struggle. It must have predicted the internal and global reaction to its victory, a reaction that threatens to render the practical administration of Palestinian affairs almost impossible. To continue regardless with a material struggle, without softening its position, would mean a potentially catastrophic failure, if measured against the heightened expectations and hopes of its supporters and the public.
Internal
Hamas has been forced to accept a change in leadership as a result of targeted Israeli assassinations in the recent past. It now keeps the names of those who make up its collective leadership a closely guarded secret. A close examination of the group reveals signs of disagreement on policy and hints of dissension on key issues. It could be argued that an apparent difference of opinion is superficial – perhaps a tactical ploy so that the group is not seen to change its core position overnight and risk losing popular support. However, the likelihood is that this is not the case, and the friction between party members witnessed on a number of pivotal matters, is in fact, entirely genuine. Foremost amongst these, have been the contrasting positions on whether Hamas should have participated in the elections in the first place, and having now come to power, whether it should implement the Shariah (Islamic Law) in its totality or incorporate other legal sources into the legislative framework.
According to Atef Adwan, an elected Hamas official from Gaza, Shariah would be preferable as the main source of legislation “but you can’t have a stream that goes against the world”. In contrast, Mohammad Abu Teir, a Hamas MP from Jerusalem stated “Shariah is the reference and I am not afraid to say it”.
How it overcomes potential internal rifts will be vital for Hamas, if it is to prevent fragmentation, and dissolution of its strength. The leadership will be keen to quell any conflicting views that may damage the party and will seek to present, and maintain, a united front.
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