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Bush gibbers
At a press conference in New Delhi on 2 March 2006 20, Jim Axelrod of CBS News had the temerity to ask President Bush: “… what kind of message, sir, does it send to the world that India, which has been testing [nuclear weapons] as late as 1998 … and … has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- is this a reward for bad behavior, as some critics suggest? And what kind of message does it send to other countries that are in the process of developing nuclear technology? Why should they sign the NPT if India is getting a deal without doing so, sir?” There is no presentable answer to this. Particularly, for a President whose National Security Strategy published in March 2006 [21] declares: “The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our national security.” and sets an objective of “closing a loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that permits regimes to produce fissile material that can be used to make nuclear weapons under cover of a civilian nuclear power program”. So adherence to (a tightened) NPT is apparently a sine qua non of countering the greatest threat to US national security – but India is an exception which is to be rewarded for not adhering (while Iran which is adhering is to be denied what is supposed to be its “inalienable right” under the NPT to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes). The President had no presentable answer and he gibbered for a full two minutes. It’s worth viewing on the White House website [20]. It begins with the following insights:
“What this agreement says is things change, times change, that leadership can make a difference, and telling the world -- sending the world a different message from that which is -- what used to exist in people's minds.
“I -- listen, I've always said this was going to be a difficult deal for the Prime Minister to sell to his parliament, but he showed great courage and leadership. And it's difficult for the American President to sell to our Congress, because some people just don't want to change and change with the times. I understand that. But this agreement is in our interests, and therefore, Jim, I'm confident we can sell this to our Congress as in the interest of the United States, and at the same time make it clear that there's a way forward for other nations to participate in a -- in civilian nuclear power in such a way as to address nonproliferation concerns.” In fact, the Indian Prime Minister has required little or no courage in arguing for the deal – because the deal required India to do very little, and required it to do absolutely nothing to restrain its nuclear weapons programme. As the Prime Minister told the Lok Sabha on 6 March 2006 [14] : “There will be no capping of our strategic [ie nuclear weapons] programme, … . No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes.”
Both sides to the deal are agreed on this: for example, Condoleezza Rice stated it plainly to the House International Relations Committee on 5 April 2006, saying [22] : “The initiative does not cap Indian nuclear weapons production …” This was India’s bottom line, and it has achieved its bottom line. Without having its nuclear weapons capability restrained in any way, it will gain access to nuclear materials and equipment for the expansion of its nuclear power programme, access that has been almost completely denied to it for more than 30 years. It will acquire the privileges of a “nuclear-weapon” state recognised by the NPT without having to sign up the NPT. The deal is a triumph for India. The interesting question is: will the US get its hoped for quid pro quo – that India moves decisively into the US camp in world affairs?
References:
[1] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf
[2] pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm
[3] http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/
[4] http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/india/us-india-agreement.htm
[5] http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/65458.htm
[6] http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG.asp
[7] http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf254r2p1.shtml
[8] disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/npt/1995dec2.htm
[9] disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/npt/finaldoc.html
[10] http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_11/wulf.asp
[11] http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2002.html
[12] www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf
[13] commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa23323.000/hfa23323_0f.htm
[14] pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm
[15] meaindia.nic.in/treatiesagreement/2006/07ta0703200601.pdf
[16] news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4647956.stm
[17] http://www.mea.gov.in/
[18] http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/india/20060327_DraftNSGProposal.asp
[19] usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2005/Sep/09-968262.html
[20] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060302-9.html
[21] http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf
[22] wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/ric040506.pdf
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