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“Nuclear-weapon” states
Having exploded a nuclear weapon before 1 January 1967, five states – the US, the UK, Russia,
France and China – qualify to sign up to the NPT as “nuclear-weapon” states and are allowed by the NPT to keep their nuclear weapons. The only significant obligation placed upon them is in Article I of the Treaty, which says:
“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.” This is not an onerous obligation, since they have an interest in preventing other states acquiring the ultimate weapon of self-defence, that is, nuclear weapons. Also, in stark contrast to “non-nuclear-weapon” states, they have no obligation to place any of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. True, each of the “nuclear-weapon” states has a voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2002 11 explains:
“Voluntary offer safeguards agreements have been concluded with the five nuclear-weapon States. Each State offers some or all of its civilian nuclear material and/or facilities from which the Agency may select some for the application of safeguards.”
Note that the materials and facilities within the scope of the agreement are “offered” for inspection by the “nuclear-weapon” state and the “offer” can be withdrawn at any time. Needless to say, materials and facilities with a military purpose are not offered for inspection. The IAEA carried out no inspections at all in Russia in 2002, because “no facilities were designated for inspection” by Russia [11].
These arrangements are a far cry from the full-scope IAEA safeguards required of all “non-nuclearweapon” states that have signed the NPT. These safeguards have the well-defined purpose of seeking to ensure that “non-nuclear-weapon” states are not developing nuclear weapons. However, the purpose of partial-scope IAEA safeguards in states that already possess nuclear weapons is not obvious. Manifestly, it cannot be to prevent the development of a nuclear weapons capability. Nor can it play any role in monitoring, let alone restraining, nuclear weapons production – since oversight of military installations is always outside the scope of the safeguards.
Why do “nuclear-weapon” states enter into these “voluntary offer safeguards agreements”? The IAEA Safeguards Glossary [12] says that they do so “inter alia, to allay concerns that the application of IAEA safeguards could lead to commercial disadvantages for the nuclear industries of nonnuclear- weapon States” (paragraph 1.21). Can it be that they are merely to add to the overheads of the nuclear industries in the official “nuclear-weapon” states?
The separation plan
The safeguards arrangement that the US has agreed with India bears some similarity to these “voluntary offer safeguards agreements”. India’s nuclear facilities are to be divided into “civilian” and “military”, with a view to placing the “civilian” under IAEA safeguards, so that material originating from “civilian” facilities is not used for military purposes by India. Robert Joseph, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security in the State Department, spelt out the US requirements for the split to the House International Relations Committee on 8 September 2005, as follows [13]:
“… the civil/military split must be comprehensive enough … to provide strong assurances to supplier states and the IAEA that materials and equipment provided as part of civil cooperation will not be diverted to the military sphere.”
This means that all foreign-supplied reactors, and all reactors fuelled from abroad, will have to be deemed “civilian” on a permanent basis. For domestic consumption, India has sought to present the additional IAEA oversight as the result of India accepting “the same responsibilities and practices as other states with advanced nuclear technology”, in other words, that the new arrangements amounted to a “voluntary offer safeguards agreement”, like those entered into by official “nuclear-weapon” states. See, for example, the Indian Government statement of 29 July 2005 2, which went so far as to say:
“Nuclear weapon states, including the US, have the right to shift facilities from civilian category to military and there is no reason why this should not apply to India.”
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