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| China: Pretender or Contender? |
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International power
These collective changes in the content, character, and execution of China's foreign policy over the last ten years represent an important evolution from Beijing's narrow and reactive approach to global affairs in the past. Within the last three years, and especially since September 11, 2001, the writings of Chinese strategists have begun to reflect a critical shift in their view of the international system and China's role in it. For example, provocative articles have recently run in major Chinese newspapers and journals advocating that China abandon its long-held victim mentality (shouhaizhe xintai). The writers reject the persistent emphasis on China's "150 years of shame and humiliation" 12 as the main lens through which the Chinese view their place in modern international affairs. Influential Chinese analysts have begun to promote instead China's adoption of a "great-power mentality" (daguo xintai). This emerging notion would replace Chinese victimhood with a confidence born of two decades of impressive economic growth and a tacit recognition of the limits of China's current international influence.
A natural extension of these ideas is China's growing emphasis on great-power relations (daguo guanxi) as a top foreign policy priority. Chinese strategists increasingly see their interests as more akin to major powers and less associated with those of developing nations. This change alone represents a significant perceptual shift from the 1990s. Chinese officials now talk explicitly about the need to "share global responsibilities" among major powers --China included.
US attempts to curb China’s influence
These changes in economy and foreign policy have not gone unnoticed in the US. Outright competition with China would expend US resources and frustrate the emergence of a sustainable balance of power in Asia. Although the Clinton and Bush administrations defined the relationship with China differently using terms such as "engagement" and "containment", the objective for both seems to have been the same, to curtail China's growth.
Japan
In early 2003, Japan's defence minister Shigeru Ishiba said, "The Japanese constitution permits my position. Attacking North Korea after a missile attack on Japan is too late"13, a sentiment echoed many times since by a number of Japanese leaders. The position of Article 9 of the American-drafted constitution, which restricts Japan's development of military capability, is now being seriously eroded. This possibility of Japan going nuclear throws the Pacific, and especially the growing and seemingly unstoppable progress of China, into a state of flux. The leader of the opposition Liberal party Ichiro Ozawa commented "…three to four thousand warheads are immediately possible, we will never be beaten on military power if we get serious". 13
The question on many people's lips is why now? Article 9 has been the mainstay of US-Japan security policy for a considerable amount of time, but this is changing because of two factors. Firstly the changing demographics in Japan mean that a more youthful populace who could once be confident of leading Asia economically,, have found that their country's influence has waned considerably. Japan has been languishing in an extended recession and resources are now diminishing. Couple this with the astronomical rise of the People's Republic and suddenly you have an insecure Japanese populace with increasingly nationalistic sentiments. Japan, which has traditionally been the bastion of developmental growth in Asia, has suddenly found that it continues to pour developmental aid into Asian countries so that they can do more and more business with China. Incredibly, Japan even continues to fund a special developmental budget to China itself, though this has been reduced sharply in recent months.
Although these factors have certainly contributed to the current state of affairs, there has remained one relatively silent voice on the issue of increased Japanese nationalism. 13 America has found that, by turning a blind eye to the tacit rollback of Article 9, considerable leverage can be enjoyed on the curtailment of Chinese interests in the region. A more confident Japanese military, with the option of going nuclear, could potentially place considerable checks in the path of the marching Chinese juggernaut.
India
American attempts to woo India began in earnest under the Clinton administration. With high profile visits and attractive economic deals, the Clinton administration opened the world's second largest populace not just to American economic interests, but also to an increased confidence in its own abilities. With an economy perhaps second only to China in terms of growth, India has seen its international standing rise. With this rise have come ambitions of permanent Security Council status and a growing belief that it is first among equals when it comes to Asia. Thus India has been seen as an ideal counterweight to the growing Chinese influence in Asia.
America's encouragement of normalised relations between Pakistan and India perhaps has more to do with pressuring Beijing on its southern flank than bringing peace to Kashmir. A resurgent India without the threat of conflict with Pakistan would be able to exert pressure on China's southern flank. India's ambitions in this area have become increasingly clear. The Indian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly stated that India's nuclear programme is not Pakistan-centric, implying that it intends to project its power far beyond its border with Pakistan.
The size and growth of the Indian Navy is a case in point. This expansion has gone hand in hand with India's economic boom. 14 As maritime interests have grown due to increased demand for foreign energy supplies, so has the Navy in order to protect these routes. This situation is not dissimilar to China's expansion of its Navy. But the fact is that both will now be vying for the same maritime space in the Indian Ocean as they seek to protect essential oil shipments. Significant Chinese Naval involvement at the new Pakistani port of Gwader15 is a fitting testament to this fact.
Vietnam
Vietnam serves as another indicator of U.S. concerns about the growth of Chinese political influence. The recent introduction of the Bilateral Trade Agreement between the Americans and the Vietnamese, has followed the normalisation of relations between these two adversaries a decade ago. The Americans have successfully manoeuvred the Vietnamese government so that it is clearly interested in increasing its interaction with the United States.
The prevailing situation between China and Vietnam suggests that the wooing of Vietnam by the Americans is not solely for economic reasons. Vietnam over the past few years has had increasingly strained relations with its erstwhile benefactor China over a territorial dispute on its northern border. China on its part failed to resolve this dispute amicably and maintain good relations with Vietnam. Thus the Americans, putting to one side their historic conflict in the area, were quick to force the door open for their interests. The initiation of this policy also indicates how successful the Clinton Administration was in curtailing and even breaking age old Chinese links in the Pacific region. It did this using a two-prong strategy; on the one hand the Clinton administration publicly tried to placate China by reclassifying her as a global partner, and at the same time it manoeuvred to curtail Chinese influence in the region, by forming Bilateral Partnerships with countries such as Vietnam.12
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