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| The Shi’a and Sunni: An Islamic or a Secular Approach? |
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Arguably, it is not these doctrinal differences but a number of unfortunate historical events that rest at the core of Sunni-Shi'a sensitivities, particularly those involving the Ahl-ul-Bait and Ali's progeny. The confrontation with Mu'awiyah ibn Sufiyan5 accounts for a number of the earliest incidents. When Ali ibn Talib eventually became head of state in 37 AH6, Mu'awiyah's refusal to recognise Ali's authority unconditionally7, while he held the governorship of Syria, resulted in armed conflict. Ali's son, Hassan ibn Ali, became head of state after Ali's death but was effectively pressured from office by Mu'awiyah, who assumed the position for himself, making him the sixth head of state after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.8 Towards the end of Mu'awiyah's own tenure, he appointed the next head of state, ordering the enforcement of his decision against any dissention. His appointed successor - his son Yazid - therefore lacked a popular mandate from the people, having been forced over them by Mu'awiyah's order; consequently he faced considerable tension with the majority of the Islamic world who did not recognise his rule. Hussain ibn Ali, the other son of Ali ibn Abi Talib, travelled to confront Yazid over his usurpation of power and to mobilise the popular discontent in Iraq that had been brewing since Yazid's ascent to power. Tragically, Hussain and his small band of supporters were murdered at Karbala, now in modern day Iraq, at the hands of Yazid's army headed by Obaidallah ibn Zeyad on the day of Ashura, the 10th Muharram 61 AH. The Shi'a since then have commemorated the tragic death of Hussain yearly on the day of Ashoura. The Umayyad period, which followed directly from the era of Mu'awiyah and Yazid suffered from the fallout of these events. The Shi'a where treated with suspicion by some of the Ummayyads and some Abbasid Caliphs, enduring brutal persecution as a result.
These tragic events need to be put in context, however: both the Sunni and Shi'a hold very similar positions on them. The Sunnis, on the whole, reject the attempts by Mu'awiyah to consolidate political power within his own family. In the confrontation between Mu'awiyah and Ali, the Sunnis hold that Mu'awiyah's condition on obedience was unacceptable and that the actions of Ali were necessary, in fact mandated by the Sharia, to prevent the disintegration of the Ummah, the same line of argument as Ali himself. Some groups went as far as to reject the attempts at arbitration between the two parties during the conflict, as it acted to legitimise Mu'awiyah's position, albeit partially. The Sunnis also hold that Yazid had usurped power illegitimately and that he was never a ruler, but that it was Abdullah ibn Zubair, a notable companion of the Prophet, who received the popular mandate from the citizens of the Islamic state.9 On the issue of persecution, some Sunnis went as far as to support the Shi'a in their stand against those in power. One the greatest Sunni scholars, Imam Abu Hanifa (d. 146 AH), provided active verbal, and reportedly financial, support to Ibrahim ibn Abdullah (d. 145 AH) who led a campaign against the Caliph al-Mansur, support for which Abu Hanifa was sent to prison where he was eventually poisoned.10 The persecution meted out by certain Ummayad and Abbasid Caliphs was not sanctioned by any school of law, whether Sunni and Shi'a, and represented deviations from any Islamic position.
Other events over the expanse of Islamic history have also acted to skew perceptions of the core doctrinal differences between of the Sunni and Shi'a. Until the creation of the Safawid state in Persia in the sixteenth century, bar a few previous glimpses of autonomy, the Shi'a had lived under the Caliphate contributing to Islam's 'Golden Age' under the Abbasids, some assuming various governmental roles as individuals but on the whole confining their activities to religious education, spiritual and moral guidance after the onset of the ghaybah. The Safawids encouraged the Shi'a, who until then had been scattered across the Islamic world, to migrate and settle in Persia and institutionalised Shi'a doctrine and jurisprudence. The Safawid rule contradicted Shi'a thinking, however. A fallible (i.e. not ma’soom) ruler not from amongst the twelve Imams lacked legitimacy in Shi'a doctrine, consequently even though some Shi'a scholars welcomed opportunities made available to them, they remained cautious and represented a body outside of government acting principally to advise the Safawid rulers on matters of morality and justice.11 Although in this sense Shi'a scholars remained quite distinct from Safawid rule, some have chosen to interpret Safawid policies as sanctioned by Shi'a thought. The Safawid attack on Baghdad whilst the Uthmani Caliph Sulayman (d. 1566) laid siege on Vienna was believed to have contributed to its failure as Sulayman marched to defend Baghdad after his retreat, an event some popularised as a Shi'a - as opposed to a Safawid - attack which curtailed Islamic advances.12
The emergence of Wahabism in the eighteenth century CE, which adopted a dhahiri (literalist) approach to jurisprudence and doctrine, drew on works by like-minded literalists to publicise the illegitimacy of Shi'a thinking. Their attack on the Shi'a was fierce and considerable; many of their anti-Shi'a arguments are still vociferously publicised by Wahabi scholars, particularly those in Saudi Arabia, and contribute considerably to Sunni rhetoric and stereotypes of the Shi'a in the Islamic world. But the Wahabi attack on the Sunni schools of thought was just as fierce. They provided justification to attack the Sunni Uthmani state on grounds of deviancy, wresting control of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina despite much bloodshed.13 The promotion of Wahabi material has served to skew history and perceptions of the Shi'a, as it has also served to confuse the Shi'a ithna ashariyya with other sects who the Shi'a themselves consider outside the fold of Islam.
It is therefore important to separate the often emotive historical narratives from doctrinal similarities and differences. Portraying the actions of Sunnis as those sanctioned by Sunni schools of law and those of Shi'a as Shi'a orthodoxy have acted to polarise the debate, through stereotyping at times the Shi'a as dissenters and the Sunnis as persecutors, paving the way for blind inaccuracies from both Western and Muslim audiences.
Secularism and political authority in Shi'a and Sunni doctrine
Similarities in doctrine then-as distinct from the turbulence of history-lend themselves to the first major objection to a secular approach in dealing with Sunni-Shi'a tensions: the separation of God from state is without precedent in both Shi'a and Sunni thinking and arguably it has been in response to secular influences in the Islamic world that calls for Islamic governance have gained prominence amongst both. In the words of one Shi'a scholar, "…the separation of religion from politics and the demand that Islamic scholars should not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them".14 This is not an obscure or a peripheral similarity, nor one identified in the name of rapprochement when no precedent for it exists; it relates to their very conception of Islam. Both Sunni and Shi'a believe, fundamentally, that Islam is a spiritual and a political system and consider Islamic texts to be a divine source of guidance-not only in matters personal, familial and spiritual but also in the basis of ruling and temporal life. Differences between Shi'a and Sunni relate to the qualities and characteristics of those who rule, not whether Islam should be divorced from ruling. For the Shi'a traditionally the head of state is infallible and divinely appointed; for the Sunni he is fallible and selected by the people, but for both ruling is based on Islamic rules and principles. Indeed, the very origin of their dispute refers to the rightful successors of the Prophet Muhammad in their role as heads of state (and spiritual guide for the Shi'a).15
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