| |
| Join Our Newsletter |
 Please Select sub-criteria |  |
|
|
|
|
| |
| Why should Iran disarm? |
03 |
|
|
| |
| |
| |
While America and Britain cite Article 1 of the NPT continuously to condemn Iran, they pay lip service to their own commitments under Article VI. The clearest illustration of this double standard is the US government's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Drawn up by the Pentagon and sent to the US Congress on December 31st 2001, the document does not even mention the term disarmament. The NPR clearly advocates a permanent doctrine in which the use of nuclear weapons is an inherent component; a clear violation of Article VI of the NPT. The NPR originally commissioned by Congress went way beyond the congressional mandate in the wake of the attacks of 9-11 by developing a strategic posture for the twenty-first century. The NPR establishes a new triad comprised of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear), defences (both active and passive) and a revitalised defence infrastructure to provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats. The addition of more active defences means that the US is no longer as dependent on offensive strike forces to provide deterrence as it was during the Cold War. Following the Cold War, the NPR shifts planning for America's strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach; a broader array of capabilities are needed to dissuade states from undertaking political, military or technological courses of action that would threaten the security of the US and her allies. The NPR contains the following elements:
- A "new mix" of nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive capabilities "is required for the diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades." (p.7)
- US military forces themselves, including nuclear forces will now be used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of allies and friends." (p.9)
- Nuclear capabilities also assure the US public that the United States will not be subject to coercion based on a false perception of US weakness among potential adversaries (p.12)
- Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack (for example deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities). (p.12-13)
- In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorised as immediate, potential or unexpected. North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies. All have longstanding hostility towards the United States and its security partners. (p.16)
- The United States will retain an inactive stockpile of nuclear weapons. (p. 32)
- There are several nuclear weapons options that might provide important advantages for enhancing the nation's deterrence posture; possible options are modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile and improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities. (p. 34-35)
- Today's nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin, characterised by moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads, silo and sea-based ballistic missiles with multiple independent re-entry vehicles, and limited retargeting capability. New capabilities must be devoted to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile, relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage. (p. 46)
- The United States has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium. While the United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite future. (p. 55)
Despite a stockpile of more than 10,000 nuclear warheads, the Bush administration received $6.52 billion in its FY 2005 budget for researching, expanding and upgrading nuclear capabilities - a $300m increase from the 2004 position. Yet despite this the Bush administration had wanted even more money to assist in development of two new nuclear bombs. This doctrine even led to hawkish Republicans like Rep. Joel Hefley (R-CO), a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, who voted against funding of some programs to say "We don't need new weapons, and in fact we cause more harm than good in our relations with other countries and in our moral position on nuclear proliferation." The FY 2004 budget which was passed by Congress included the repeal of the Furse-Spratt amendment to the 1994 Defence Authorisation Act, which had banned the development of smaller, low yield warheads of five kilotons (mini nukes) of explosive force or less. Five kiloton bombs in explosive terms are about a third of the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, a weapon that killed 240,000 people.
The NPR and the repeal of the Furse-Spratt amendment does not only ignore US disarmament commitments; it advocates several new scenarios in which nuclear weapons could be used. The NPR outlines the possible use of nuclear weapons not only against Russia and China, but also non-nuclear states such as Iran, Syria and Libya. The strategic aim of developing a new generation of low yield nuclear weapons that can be used to bomb underground facilities as a first use tactical weapon also pushes the nuclear envelope yet further. Retired Admiral Robert R Monroe writing an op-ed in the Washington Post on November 16 2004 stated that, "to have a more effective deterrent against rogue states and terrorist groups, we need a new generation of nuclear weapons".
This new US doctrine, which significantly broadens the scope for the use of nuclear weapons beyond the cold war 'last resort' stance, is a major escalation within the strategic equation. According to some scientists, the use of even small nuclear 'bunker-buster' bombs would be disastrous. The Union of Concerned Scientists stated that
"A commonly held fallacy is that an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon can penetrate deeply enough to contain all the radioactive fallout. This is not the case. The depth at which even a small nuclear weapon must be buried to ensure that it is "contained" that is, that no radiation is released when it explodes is much greater than the achievable penetration depth, so that it is impossible to prevent radioactive fallout from a nuclear EPW."
Despite Congress eliminating the modest funding requested for some of the more controversial projects in late November 2004, the Bush administration has made it clear its strategic intent will continue to be the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons in accordance with its NPR. David Smith, the chief operating officer of the National Institute for Public Policy, a conservative leaning think tank, remained undaunted after Congress's rejection and said "This will come up again and again and again."
The UK has also not taken any significant steps to eliminate its nuclear weapons (currently around 200 operational warheads), despite its obligations, refusing to decommission its own Trident submarine programme. This commitment to Trident inevitably clashes with Britain's claimed support of the NPT. Britain could also rule out plans for future nuclear weapons systems once Trident is decommissioned, but such an undertaking has not been made. Tony Blair claims that tackling weapons of mass destruction is one of the key objectives of British foreign policy, but it seems the UK's own nuclear arsenal is not part of that agenda.
| |
| |
| |
| |
« First < 1 2 3 4 5 >
Page 3 of 5 pages
| |
|
|
