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| Why should Iran disarm? |
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Has the NPT's explicit bargain broken down?
To answer this let us review the actions of two of the NWS, namely the United States and Britain. The former is at the forefront of attempts to prevent Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) such as Iran from joining the nuclear club. The prospect of a nuclear Iran is one of the few issues that generates transatlantic agreement, even if tactics differ currently. Though the US would prefer a stronger diplomatic response, both sides are in agreement that Iran should not be allowed to enrich uranium to any scale or produce plutonium, at any of its known or suspected nuclear facilities. Both sides of the Atlantic continually point to Iran's signing of the NPT as justification of their strong line, but as discussed before the NPT contains an explicit bargain, placing reciprocal obligations on states like the US and the UK. Yet both these states have shown a profound lack of interest in fulfilling their Article VI obligations as their current policies and strategic intent show. As Graham puts it:
"In the view of many of the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, however, the NPT nuclear-weapon states have not lived up to their disarmament commitments. Most importantly, the nuclear "have-nots" point to the failure by the nuclear "haves", principally the United States, to put a permanent ban on nuclear-weapon testing in place-the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally opened for signature in 1996, but it is unlikely to come into force in the foreseeable future-and the political value of nuclear weapons remains as high as it was during the Cold War. The US Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 explicitly contemplated the use of nuclear weapons not only against Russia and China, but also against Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya-at the time, all NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. If the possession of a nuclear arsenal retains its high political value to NPT nuclear-weapon states, particularly the United States, the ability to persuade states not to acquire these weapons may diminish."
The NPT was established by the nuclear nations primarily to stop nuclear weapons from becoming freely available. However, to ensure there was an incentive for NNWS to sign the treaty, the NPT contained an important bargain. It aimed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons by brokering a deal between the NWS and the NNWS, with the former agreeing to eventual disarmament and an end to the nuclear arms race, while the latter would agree not to embark upon nuclear weapons programmes. As an extra incentive, the NWS also agreed to provide the NNWS with assistance on the research and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 'without discrimination'. As Graham indicates, by making little or no progress on reducing their weapons, and in fact building the use of such weapons into strategic doctrine, the NWS undermine the rationale for NNWS to abstain from starting weapons programmes.
Some western commentators argue that the five recognised nuclear states are not contravening the NPT by not instigating unilateral nuclear disarmament. They claim that there is no moral equivalence between their actions and those of Iran. Other experts in the field consider that this view serves to dent the authority of the NPT. Richard Butler, the former chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq, told a seminar in Australia in 2002 that Americans do not appreciate the level of resentment that WMD apartheid has built. "My attempts to have Americans enter into discussions about double standards have been an abject failure - even with highly educated and engaged people," Mr Butler said. He went on to say that, "I sometimes felt I was speaking to them in Martian, so deep is their inability to understand."
The foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, writing in the International Herald Tribune in September 2004, also argue that the nuclear states are failing miserably in their obligations. They write,
"The non-proliferation treaty cannot be complied with à la carte. It is a legally binding agreement, which relies on a fine balance between the commitments of the five nuclear-weapon states - China, France, Russia, Britain and the United States - and those of the non nuclear-weapon states. The heart of the treaty is that the latter will not develop nuclear weapons in return for which the nuclear powers will reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons. In 1995 and 2000 this bargain was further refined. In 1995, the non nuclear-weapon states agreed to the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation treaty, provided that the nuclear powers pursued nuclear disarmament and that all worked toward the entry into force of the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. In 2000, the nuclear powers made an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and all parties adopted a practical plan for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Since then, however, very little progress has been made."
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