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The post-war era
The first flaw in this argument is the idea that once the occupation troops entered both states, there was a systematic attempt to uproot the prior ideologies and remove the state machinery that had supported criminal policies. Of course the post-war constitutions of Japan and Germany, drawn up in concert with the U.S. occupation authorities, place strict limits on the uses and capabilities of both countries’ armed forces. And there has, in Germany at least, been a far-reaching process to expunge all emotional connections to the crimes of the Nazi regime and the racist ideology that made them possible.
But for practical as well as geo-strategic reasons, the post-war rebuilding of both states relied to a significant extent on pre-existing capabilities and processes developed by the belligerent regimes themselves. This undermines the claim that the sole reason that Germany and Japan are successful today is that they embraced liberal values. In turn, this should challenge the consensus that liberal democracy is the only viable path for Iraq in particular, and developing nations in general, to achieve stability and prosperity.
What one finds on examining the post-war occupation of Japan and Germany after the war is that, contrary to the image portrayed by the neo-conservatives, the scale of changes imposed by the Allies was comparatively modest. This is very clear in the case of Japan, where the wartime head of state, Emperor Hirohito, remained in place after the war, despite the fact that the crimes of the regime were carried out in his name and he was seen by many as the Japanese counterpart to Hitler. There were calls for Hirohito to face the War Crimes tribunal as his Prime Minister Hideki Tojo and other politicians had done. However General Douglas MacArthur, head of U.S. forces in Japan ensured that this didn’t take place, as he believed that the continued presence of the Emperor would make it easier for the populace to accept the occupation.
In the first few months after the war, the American occupation authorities under MacArthur undertook many initiatives and brought into force a host of laws aimed at radically reshaping the political life of Japan. Hirohito was obliged to renounce his divine status as a descendant of the Sun goddess, Amaterasu, part of the process of separating the Shinto religion from the state. The people were encouraged to form trade unions, women’s groups and other organs of civil society. The War Crimes Tribunal was set up, with the aim of bringing the warmongers to justice, but also as a way to demonstrate the superiority of liberal values by giving the vanquished a fair trial.
However, as the need to confront the Soviet Union began to dominate foreign policy, the US took what has come to be known as the ‘reverse course’. The chief architect of this adjustment was the hugely influential policy maker George F. Kennan, author of the famous ‘X article’ which served as the lodestar for US Cold War diplomacy. After Secretary of State George C. Marshall appointed him Director of Policy Planning, Kennan urged changes in all areas of foreign policy. In regards to Japan, he advised the administration to shore Japan up economically and to countenance a permanent military presence. As he stated in a policy planning memo to the Secretary and Under-Secretary of State in November 1947, “The basic ideas with which we entered on the occupation of Japan apparently did not take into account the possibility of a hostile Russia and the techniques of communist political penetration. Our occupation policies have consequently been effective in disarming Japan and destroying the old pattern of militarism: but they have not produced, nor are they designed to produce, the political and economic stability which Japanese society will require if it is to withstand communist pressures after we have gone.”vii It was essential to US interests in the Far East that Japanese reconstruction be successful. As Kennan wrote in early 1948, it was of the highest priority that the US, “devise policies with respect to Japan which assure the security of those islands from communist penetration and domination as well as from Soviet military attack, and which will permit the economic potential of that country to become again an important force in the Far East.”viii
In response to this new direction, the War Crimes tribunal wound up its business by December 1948 and the purge of former government officials and business leaders was eased. Apart from key figures such as Tojo, the vast majority of the many thousands of state officials who had taken part in the war against the Allies and colonised much of East Asia remained in place in the forties and fifties, because the U.S. relied on their expertise in the process of rebuilding Japan. In total the International War Crimes Tribunal tried and convicted only 28 of the military and civilian leaders involved in the planning and execution of the war. Of these category ‘A’ convicts, 13 who had received life sentences were paroled between 1954 and 1956.
A stark example of the relatively lenient treatment given to the Japanese wartime leadership is the case of Nobusuke Kishi. As Minister of Commerce and Industry from 1941 to 1945, Kishi was a cosignatory of the declaration of war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in April 1941. From 1935 to the beginning of the war, he had been one of the top officials involved in developing industry in Japan’s Chinese colony Manchukuo (Manchuria). As a participant in the decision to wage an aggressive war, after the surrender Kishi was imprisoned as a ‘Category A’ war criminal for three years until 1948. However he did not have to face a military tribunal and hanging like Tojo, the man who appointed him to the ministerial role. In 1952, restrictions on wartime politicians were lifted and hence Kishi resumed his political activities. He was a key figure in the creation of the Liberal Democratic party, the ruling party for almost the entire post-war period, and served as Prime Minister from 1957 to 1960. The U.S. was happy to work with former fascists such as Kishi because of their sound anti-communist credentials.
While the American occupation initially aimed to radically reshape Japanese society and culture such that it could never again serve as a platform for militarism, this goal had to be altered drastically with the fall of the Iron Curtain. The Truman administration had planned for both Germany and Japan’s economies to be de-industrialised such that they would no longer have the heavy industry to serve any future war-machine. But the Allies quickly realised that in order to confront the threat of expansionist Communism, they needed both Japan and Germany to be model pupils of Capitalism with flourishing economies. In Japan, the US had worked to break up the zaibatsu, or money cliques, which had been the backbone of Japan’s military and industrial power. These family-run enterprises, some of which date back to the 17th century, were highly diversified and had influence in all sectors of the Japanese economy. The initial policy of breaking up the zaibatsu was based on the belief that the concentration of so much of Japan’s wealth and decision-making power in so few hands would stifle democracy and limit the influence of the general populace. Also, since the zaibatsu had profited so handsomely from the military requirements of wartime Japan, they were viewed as likely backers of any new irruption of expansionist fever.
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