Introduction

The vocal demands of Muslims around the globe for an Islamic State can no longer be ignored either by politicians, policymakers of secular states or the ‘prophets’ of globalization.The re-establishment of an Islamic political authority as an effective defence against a multitude of perceived victimizations of the Islamic world is gaining credence in all strata of Muslim society.

Currently, economic and scientific development is attributed to the post-Enlightenment rise of secular western liberal democracies. Indeed, governments that are accountable, freedom of association and human rights seem to be newfound gems belonging only to modern societies. So, when discussion of an alternative Islamic political system or authority is raised, proponents of such alternatives face expressions of incredulity and are quizzed about the wisdom of returning to an authoritarian system of governance, where the citizens’ right to account their rulers is denied. The ghosts of the ‘authoritarian’ past haunt many, including those who are contemplating an Islamic system of governance. Those who are calling for the establishment of an Islamic State are told that only the integration of broad aspects of western political thought and political experience will enable Islam to survive as a meaningful political force – particularly in the area of democratic institutions. [1]

This article aims to explore the nature of authority, particularly the precarious relationship between ‘the authoritative’ and ‘the authoritarian’, as the former can quite easily become the latter when enforcement capability is acquired.

The Nature of Authority

Discussion about the Islamic State cannot take place without debating what constitutes authority in Islam.There is no agreement on a single social theory of authority as far as society is concerned; there are only multiple perspectives that are plausible. In Michel Foucault’s words: “Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true”. [2] Indeed, the idea of authority is always contentious in any legal and political system, despite a general consensus that no society can function effectively without a unified legal system under some form of authority.

The law in any society demands our obedience and hence authority over us. The main problem people have with authority is the degree of submission of reason and of self-autonomy to it. It is in the nature of authority that it requires submission; even if one thinks that what is requested is irrational. [3] Similarly the principle of autonomy entails action on one’s own judgement. Since authority sometimes requires action against one’s own judgement, it requires abandoning one’s moral autonomy. [4]

Authority therefore, in a certain sense, goes against the very fabric of rational thinking and autonomy. If this is the case, then those who believe in authority are subsequently committed to a somewhat irrational belief. However, others who may be critical of the legitimacy of any authority, or most authorities, from both a rational and moral perspective, will still be deterred by the thought that no authority can ever be legitimate. Despite such apparent paradoxes, authority in the shape of a ‘political authority’ is recognized as a necessity for human society. Without it agreement on how a society should function or how systems of the state should be implemented cannot be realized. The Islamic society at its inception recognised obedience to such an authority based in the belief of existence of God (Allah) and the authenticity of His communication:The Qur’an,

“Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority amongst you.” [5] (TMQ:4:59)

Types of Authority

Further distinction should be made regarding what form of authority is being referred to in any discussion. Terms such as ‘coercive authority’ and ‘persuasive authority’ [6] or being ‘in authority’ and being ‘an authority’ [7] need to be distinguished before discussion of the Islamic context.

Coercive authority is the ability to direct the conduct of another person through enforcement mechanisms such as benefits, threats or punishment attempting to leave the person no option but to comply with directives. These enforcement mechanisms are attributed usually to someone ‘in authority’, meaning someone occupying an official or structural position and hence empowered to command obedience. Political authority with such enforcement mechanisms is essentially coercive authority.

Persuasive authority involves the ability to direct the belief and conduct of a person through trust. The dynamics are different to coercive authority in the sense that a person surrenders his autonomy of judgement to the perceived special knowledge, judgement and wisdom of ‘an authority’.This person or body is considered as ‘authoritative’ on a particular given matter by the person who is persuaded by their authority.

Coercive authority does not require the surrender of private judgement.The private conscience of the submitting person is irrelevant to such authority as long as there is obedience. Social philosopher Richard Friedman argues that relying on someone who is an authority involves establishing a common ground where the person who is an authority and the person deferring to him, both agree on a shared framework in a particular field of knowledge.This includes understanding what is accessible to the human in terms of knowledge and insight, even though the person obeying acknowledges that he is himself deprived from that knowledge or experience through the lack of necessary learning, wisdom, opportunity, revelation, etc. [8] Friedman views that deference to persuasive authority necessarily means a surrendering of independent judgement and reasoning. [9]

Professor Abou El Fadl (UCLA) considers Friedman too restrictive in his view of authority as he argues that just because a person expects an explanation for a particular issue from an expert or an (persuasive) authority does not necessarily relegate his or her authoritativeness to that person. [10]

In the context of discussing the types of authority both the persuasive and coercive elements are at play in the Islamic political system.

Authoritarianism

Political authorities that stifle debate within wider society, whether it be to do with public policy, the conduct of politicians, or lack of transparency, are generally considered to be authoritarian. Political authorities within the Muslim world are often labelled as authoritarian, whether they claim to be secular or religious as they have a legacy of repression.The accusation of authoritarianism within a political system cannot be levied only at the Muslim world or indeed any ‘religion’ based systems. Robert Michels, a political theorist, convincingly argued in his classic treatise on democracies that all political systems, including democracies, are under the strong grip of what he named the Iron Law of Oligarchy. Michel argues that political systems suffer very powerful pressures towards centralization and oligarchy, and that these pressures are a natural tendency within all human organizations. [11] There are various degrees of authoritarianism; even very ‘democratic’ and ‘liberal’ states are authoritarian to some extent, for example in areas of national security.The coercive measures undertaken by a state to ensure conformity can easily lead to authoritarianism.

Secularism delegates religion to personal life, and it strictly forbids its entertainment within the political sphere of society.A person is free to give authority to whatever spiritual basis he wishes for self morality. In this circumstance it is acceptable to succumb to the ‘persuasive authority’ of religion regardless of the nature of such persuasion. However, to bring this spiritual aspect of authority from the private sphere into the realm of political life, where one can be coerced into obedience via state mechanisms leads to authoritarianism as far as secularism is concerned; this is supported by the European historical experience of unaccountable clerics and rulers.

The Islamic creed has a political system that has a concept of authority as one of the means to unify society under its system. It is assumed that because the belief in God is central to the Islamic system, an Islamic political system is thought to be like any other religious state and thus intrinsically authoritarian.

The Nature and Source of Authority in Islam

The concept of authority and its place in Islam has to be discussed in the context of Islamic law (Shari’ah). Examination of the Islamic creeds demonstrates that they are at odds with Plato’s idealism, as Islam maintains that the material which constitutes the world is a reality that is independent of reason. It also contradicts Karl Marx’s realistic materialism, as it does not believe that material is the basis of all existence. Rather, the Islamic belief transcends both matter and reason, towards an eternal cause, considered to be the basic principle that underpins the source of all that we can comprehend of this world both at the material and abstract levels. This eternal and infinite cause is God (Allah) according to the Islamic creed, and He is the creator of all existence and this is the central tenet of the Islamic system. [12]

Islam means submission to the will of Allah. This has been the most common explanation of the word Islam. Submission to Allah is the dominant principle present in all manifestations of Islam: in its ideas, forms, ethics and worship. This submission inherently acknowledges an authority. In Islamic thought, ultimate authority for any determination resides in Allah. Allah is the ultimate authority both in sovereignty and legislation. If Allah wants one thing and not another then any person who wishes the contrary does so in defiance of Allah. He states in the Qur’an:

“The rule is to none but Allah”. [13]

The Islamic belief is therefore a system of normative values, which act as criteria for identifying the major societal objectives, evaluating institutions and justifying the claims of legitimacy. It justifies political power as well as the use of force and the right to obedience. [14]

Islam rejects the idea that philosophers are endowed with a perfect mind, or that they can be entrusted with legislation and management of social affairs in contrast to Plato’s belief of the philosopher-ruler. Instead it recognizes a messenger who mediates between the Creator and His Creation conveying and explaining His Message.The messenger does not have any legislative authority or command of obedience, except in his position as a messenger of the ultimate Authority. [15] Islam also rejects the positivists approach to authority, which sees legislative authority as detached from any normative values. Unlike the Positivists, Islam does not view law as being detached from the aims of society. It does not see how a society or a state can be defined without reference to its aims. [16]

As far as Muslims are concerned Allah and the Prophet are the only authorities that count i.e. they are the authoritative in Islam. The directives of Allah for the Muslim are contained in the text of the Qur’an and hence to understand the Divine will, it is a matter of interpreting this text. The Sunnah, which constitutes the sum total of the statements, actions and approvals of the Prophet Muhammad is an additional source of guidance. Since there have been numerous attempts to forge elements of the Sunnah, a matter not possible with the Qur’an, an elaborate discipline of authentication and verification has developed around the Sunnah, whose collected text is known as Hadith.The verification of the authenticity of a Hadith determines its degree of authority.

The Muslims’ Quest for Political Authority

To understand the nature of political authority that Muslim political organisations now seek to establish, it is necessary to appreciate how legitimate political authority is derived in Islam and how this was implemented in the Prophetic and subsequent periods.This does not mean however that one can surmise the reality of Islamic political doctrine from studying Islamic history in different eras, as only the earliest period is considered to be a source of emulation from a legislative point of view. A common pitfall that many critics of political Islam fall into is to ignore the fact that the practices of the rulers in different eras of Islamic history and the Islamic doctrine itself are two separate matters. The former may concur with the latter, or it may be divergent from it, as history testifies. [17]

Since the Prophet was the primary human agent in explaining the Qur’an and demonstrating how to practically submit to the authority of God, it would be difficult to argue that he was not regarded as a source of normative practice. The Qur’an itself explicitly adds credence to that concept repeatedly enjoining the Muslims to obey the Prophet and emulate his actions:

“He who obeys the messenger obeys God.” [18]

The Messenger’s Quest for Authority

The Prophet Muhammad being ‘an authority’ was not an issue of contention as far as the Muslims were concerned. The Messenger however was very clear from the outset of his mission that he had to be ‘in authority’ i.e. in political authority to be effective with his mission of implementing Islam as an ideology. It is interesting to observe the targeted nature of his call, from the early days, at the then existing political authority. Prophet Muhammad recited verses of the Qur’an that publicly challenged the political authority of the Quraysh, the leading tribe of Arabia in which the Prophet was born. [19] This could be understood as undermining the existing political authority in an attempt to create a new axis of authority by changing the public opinion.The physical torture, boycott and various other forms of torment the Muslims suffered in Mecca (Makkah) could be seen as an indication of the effectiveness of the Prophet’s campaign to undermine the authority of the ruling elite, as the leaders of the Quraysh sanctioned all these aggressions.The Prophet was born and brought up in Makkah. He spent the first 13 years of his Prophethood in Makkah and subsequently moved to Madinah as his message had a more receptive audience there.To many the Hijra (Migration) of the Prophet from Makkah to Madinah, which marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar, was flight from oppression undertaken simply for self-preservation.The circumstances pre- and post-Hijra however indicate that there were political ambitions underlying this period, during which Prophet Muhammad was eagerly seeking political authority for his message. [20]

The Prophet was active in not only seeking the acceptance of Islam as a belief system amongst his people but also in seeking the means by which he could accede to political authority.The process of seeking the Nusrah (material support) is well-documented, especially during the last three years of Makkah when the Prophet secretly visited the heads of no less than 40 tribes with his Companions. Some offered to give support and authority but stipulated certain conditions in exchange.The Prophet however was seeking unconditional authority on his terms, which finally the ‘Aws and the Khazraj tribes of Madinah gave to him, leading to the Hijra. [21]

The Messenger in Authority

The era ushered in by the arrival of the Prophet to Madinah, not as a fugitive, but as the head of the new Islamic state, brought into reality the aspirations of the Prophet and the Muslims. The next ten years until the death of the Prophet saw the expansion of the Islamic political authority. The Prophet Muhammad demonstrated his political acumen by leading the state through many battles and peaceful missions in order to extend his vision in the region. Despite having uncontested political authority, the Prophet’s decade of state administration was not an iron-fisted approach, but rather consultation (Shura) of a variety of people of Madinah. On technical matters, he would consult those with expertise; he would consult the general public on issues that affected the wider society in which there were no particular restrictions from the Shari’ah. [22] This was in accordance with the instructions of God as mentioned in the Qur’an:

“And do consult them in the matter, and if you decide (on an action/ on an opinion) put your trust in Allah.” (TMQ 3:159)

Before the battle of Uhud for instance, the Prophet demonstrated his commitment to consultation of the public by following the majority opinion and encamping outside Madinah, even though he thought it would better to mount a defence from inside Madinah.

Authority after the Messenger

It was well understood amongst the Muslim community (Ummah) of Madinah that it was their divinely ordained right to appoint whom they wished after the Prophet to look after their affairs according to Islam. Upon the death of the Prophet, despite being in a state of shock due to his loss, the Ummah of Madinah wasted no time in appointing a political leader to manage their affairs. The Prophet did not explicitly choose his successor leaving it up to the community to do so. Eventually this point of succession is however contentious and has lead to the Sunni/Shi’a divide. [23] The Muslims naturally differed in their view as to who was most suitable to become their leader and have political authority over them. Issues ranging from their piety, tribal background (including the family of the Prophet), political judgement, personality etc, were all considered in their assessment of suitability of a candidate. Obviously certain criteria took precedence over others, hence intense debate followed. [24] To the people however, only their popular consent could mandate someone as head of state.

Immediately after the death of the Prophet, a group of the Ummah known as the ahl-al hall wal aqd (people of influence/power) who represented the various people of the community, debated intensely in the court of the Banu Saa’idah whom to appoint as their leader.The Bay’ah (the pledge of allegiance) the only method to legitimately choose the Caliph – was given to Abu Bakr after much deliberation and he thus became the first of the Rashideen (Rightly-Guided) Caliphs. The Bay’ah is a contractual process and like all contracts it can be broken, if the ruler violates the contractual conditions the people stipulate this will warrant his dismissal from office. The Ummah appointed Abu Bakr as a successor to the political authority of the Prophet. His appointment was conditional upon the implementation of the Shari’ah according to the Qur’an and the Prophetic Sunnah and his own ijtihad (derivation of legislation from the primary sources of Islam). [25]

On his deathbed, the people of Madinah requested that Abu Bakr appoint his successor.They were happy with his leadership and indicated that they would be happy with his choice of successor.Abu Bakr initially declined to do this, saying that it was a matter for the people to choose his successor and not his right. After being pressed, he nominated Umar ibn Al-Khattab as his successor. After the death of Abu Bakr, Umar ibn Al-Khattab had to receive the Bay’ah from the Ummah, despite being nominated by his predecessor, as the nomination was itself not binding.This indicates that it was well understood at that time that it was the right of the Ummah to appoint someone into political authority and that the Bay’ah was the sole legitimate method for such an appointment.This procedural element continued with the third and fourth Rashideen Caliphs. [26]

The fact that most of the Companions were held in high esteem in the community at large did not absolve them of accountability to the Ummah. The Ummah understood political accountability as an integral part of the wider Islamic duty of ‘al-amr bil ma’ruf wal nahy an al-munkar’ (commanding the right and forbidding the wrong).Accountability was a part of the tenure of each of the Rashideen Caliphs and they responded to it positively.This was demonstrated by Caliph Umar’s response to a man in the audience who took out his sword and told Umar that he would correct him with it if he (Umar) went astray in his office of power. Umar responded by saying:

“Praise be to Allah, there are men in the nation who would put me right if I go astray.” [27]

After the Rashideen Caliphs, the Muslims saw the advent of the Umayyad Caliphate, whose founder was Mu’awiyah. The Umayyad Caliphate was characterised by the introduction of the alien concept (bid’ah) of inherited ruling into Islamic political culture and changed the Islamic State into something like a kingdom. This made the pre-requisite of Bay’ah for legitimacy of authority almost nominal and the practice became a formality in the eyes of most people. [28] They tried to treat their rule as if it was a divine right bestowed upon them, rather than the right of the Ummah to choose their rulers.This was in contrast to the earlier Caliphs who saw themselves as ‘Caliph of the Messenger’ meaning a successor to the Prophet only in his political role by the choice of the people. The erosion of this right of the Ummah to freely appoint the political authority did not necessarily mean that they neglected their duty to account their rulers.This is indicated by the Umayyads constant need to justify their practices according to the Prophetic Sunnah. [29]

The Separation of the Authoritative and the Authoritarian in Early Islam

From the time of the Prophet to the end of the Rashideen Caliphs the ‘persuasive authority’ (in light of textual evidence) and ‘coercive authority’ (in the sense of state enforcement capabilities) were one. Each of the Caliphs was competent to give legal opinions (as scholars of jurisprudence) with regards to issues pertaining to all aspects of life. However, they did not attempt to adopt legal opinions for every issue and enforce them on the public. In particular, issues pertaining to personal worships were left for individuals to find their own ‘persuasive authority’. They would adopt and enforce their opinion in issues that were imperative for the smooth running of the state and had to be obeyed with the understanding of the Shari’ah principle: “The order of the ruler settles the difference.” [30]

The Umayyads attempted to combine juristic interpretation and ruling as their sole right, claiming this was the practice of the Rashideen Caliphs. However, towards the latter part of the Umayyad period, the jurists asserted clearly that interpretative authority of the Islamic legal texts was not the sole right of the ruler.The legal schools of thought (madhahib) were formulated and new vigour for interpretation and ijtihad was found based on the legal schools’ foundations (usul). [31]

This continued into the era of the Abbasid Caliphate, where there was a clear distinction between the ‘coercive authority’ of the Caliphs and their need for the ‘persuasive authority’ of the scholars. As a result there was some degree of accounting from the ‘an authority’ of the ‘in authority’. The Caliphs patronised some scholars for legitimacy and other prominent scholars were occasionally imprisoned for their opposition and refusal to take offices offered by the Caliphs. [32]

The Ulema (Scholars) were increasingly seen as the guardians of the original message of the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunnah and this was solidified in the minds of the Ummah with the expansion and development of Islamic jurisprudence. The constant referencing to the ‘combined text’ of the Qur’an and Hadith lead to an increase in the corpus of Islamic law (fiqh).The development of principles of Ijma’ (consensus) and Qiyas (analogical deductions in reference to the Text) further aided the jurists to deal with increasingly complex issues, including those of governance. [33]

While the scholars were respectful of the Caliphs and preached obedience, they were clear that the law was their province and it was theoretically binding on the Caliphs and their subjects. [34] The scholars enjoyed a significant degree of independence in expressing opinions as long as they could back it up from authoritative sources.This is in stark contrast with the European experience of the past, where the Christians subjected the law of the Church to the whims of the ruler by endowing the king with a divine right over the people. The clergy was given the monopoly to interpret the divine law for the king. This lead to various excesses from both king and Church, such as issuing ‘pardon cheques’, excommunicating opponents, and burdensome taxes on the general public.This ‘partnership of authority’ in history is seen as the evidence of the tendency to authoritarianism of religious politics. [35]

Accountability in the Islamic Political System

Muslims generally accept that the common political function of looking after people’s affairs is the responsibility of the Ummah, because the Qur’an addresses the Ummah at large, not the ruler. However, because the Ummah cannot act as one individual, it has to delegate its authority to one individual, the ruler, who is still theoretically subordinate to the Ummah.The original right to rule therefore is that of the Ummah, and the ruler is an executive agent. [36]

The scholars of Islam, who are legal experts, understood that the obedience to any ruler commanded in the Qur’an [37] is conditional upon those rulers being subservient to the sovereignty of the Shari’ah (The Qur’an and the Sunnah) and any disputes with such rulers should be judged according to the Shari’ah. Hence, they made it their job to meticulously scrutinise and account the actions of the ruler in terms of congruity to the Shari’ah.Any complaint during the time of the Prophet’s ruling and subsequently by the Rashideen Caliphs with regards to ‘acts of injustice’ (Mazlema) perpetrated by the state against the people, which could include the ruler, was investigated. This subsequently developed into the post of Qadi Al-Mazaalim (Judge of the Unjust Acts) during the Abbasid period and he was responsible for looking into complaints of the people against the ruler. [38] This restricts the ruler from abusing his power and prevents authoritarianism.

Indeed, accounting the ruler is seen as one of the noblest activities a Muslim could be engaged in and it falls under the broad category of the duty of ‘Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong’. [39] As is stated in the Qur’an:

“Let there arise a group amongst you that call to the Good, commanding the right and forbidding the wrong; those are the successful” (TMQ 3:104) [40]

The Prophet has also stated in relation to accounting the ruler:”The best jihad is a word of truth in the presence of an unjust ruler” [41] and also “The Master of Martyrs is Hamza, and a man who stood up to a tyrant ruler to advise him and was killed.” [42]

These Hadith of the Prophet implicitly recognise that rulers are ultimately human and can therefore be unjust, despite being chosen for the best of their qualities. But injustice on behalf of the ruler does not absolve the Muslim of the duty of accounting the ruler, whether as an individual or collectively in political parties. The Qur’anic verse mentioned above indicates the formation of such political parties as an additional mechanism of accounting the ruler.

Accountability without Democracy

It is a prominent view that accountability and true ‘people authority’ cannot be established without the democratic framework. Democracy espouses secularism, which presupposes that there is at least a formal separation of religion and state. It is widely believed that religion does not allow accountability and western history bears testimony to this from the era of the Church’s dominance.

In western secular democracies we find that the processes by which the community is involved in their political determinations do not necessarily reflect ‘people power’. It is assumed that the government sometimes has to take ‘unpopular’ decisions as people of authority. If the power of democracy is in accounting its government every 4-5 years, electing or removing her from power by the ballot box, one could argue that is too little and too late. Democratic governments exhibit symptoms of authoritarianism, especially when it comes to issues of national security or foreign policy. Having courts of justice where a case can be brought against the authority is not unique to democracy as we saw earlier in the case of the Islamic court of the Mazaalim, which has the jurisdiction to remove the ruler if he oversteps the boundaries of Shari’ah.

Also, political parties that proscribe to a secular creed are not necessarily the only ‘guardian angels’ who can ensure accountability of their authorities. Political parties who proscribe to an Islamic creed regardless of their numbers are also fully capable of performing this honourable function of accounting the ruler. Indeed, this is pivotal in the Islamic political system to ensure an authority that is accountable.

Conclusion

To argue that the call to Islamic political authority would constitute suffocation of the right to account authority and the abrogation of ‘people power’ does not carry weight if reference is made to the Islamic sources and the practices of the Prophet and his Companions. All political systems tend towards authoritarianism, as they need to regulate the societies they govern – that is natural. The authoritarian regimes that Muslims face in their lands today are not the legacy of their Islamic past but the bitter aftertaste of the post-colonialism era. Most of these authoritarian regimes are, by their nature, despotic and repressive and rely on the goodwill of their historic masters to maintain the status quo.

The Divine is beyond accounting but He does not extend that status to the humans in authority trying to understand and implement the Divine Will.

The ability to hold the political authority to account in Islam is linked intricately to the independence of the judiciary from the state. Also, if political parties neglect the duty of ‘commanding the right and forbidding the wrong’ in modern political terms, this can lead to authoritarianism. The Muslims can examine their own rich legal history, rather than refer to others with conflicting values, to find ways to establish authorities that are accountable.

Reference

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2. Foucalt M, Power/Knowledge, Pantheon Books, New York, 1980
3. Joseph Raz, “The Authority of Law”, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1979, pp 3-4
4. supra note 2
5. Mohammed M. Pickthall, “The Glorious Qur’an- Text and explanatory translation,” Chicago, Iqra’ International Education Foundation (No publication date), Chapter 4 verse 59 (C4:V59) [hereinafter The Qur’an]
6. Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Speaking in God’s Name”, Oxford, Oneworld publications 2001, page 18
7. R B Friedman, “On the concept of Authority in Political Philosophy”, Authority, Ed. Joseph Raz. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990.pp 56-91
8. supra note 7 p 83
9. supra note 7 p 67
10. Supra note 5, p 20
11. Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A sociological study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York:The Free Press, 1962
12. Muhammad Baqir As-Sadr “Our Philosophy”, translated by Shams C. Inati, London,The Muhammadi Trust in association with KPI Ltd, 1987. pp 239-260
13. The Qur’an 12:40
14. Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid, “The Qur’an and Politics”, p 15
15. Supra note 14, pp 15-16
16. Supra note 14, p 17
17. Mahdi Zahraa, “Characteristic features of Islamic Law: Perceptions and Misconceptions.” Arab Law Quarterly,Vol. 15, No. 2, (2000), pp 168-196
18. The Holy Qur’an 4:80
19. Salim Fredericks & Ahmer Feroze, “From Darkness into Light”, London, Al-Khilafah Publications, 2000, pp 32-42.
20. Zakaria Bashier, “Hijra: Story and Significance”, Leicester,The Islamic Foundation, 1987, pp 101-103
21. Zakaria Bashier, “The Makkan crucible”, Leicester,The Islamic foundation, 1991, pp 191-194
22. W. Montgomery Watt, “Islamic Political Thought”, Edinburgh, University Press, 1968, pp 20-30
23. Antony Black, “The History of Islamic Political Thought”, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2001, pp 39-40
24. Ira M. Lapidus, “A History of Islamic Societies”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp 54-56.
25. Wilferd Madelung, “The Succession to Muhammad: A study of the early Caliphate”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp 28-31.
26. W. Montgomery Watt, “Islamic political Thought”, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1968, p 35
27. Shibli Nu’mani, “Al-Farooq: the life of Omar the Great”,Translated by Zafar Ali Khan, New Delhi, Idara Isha’at-e-Diniyat Ltd, 1996, p 379.
28. Supra note 32, p38-39
29. Patricia Crone & Martin Hinds “God’s Caliph”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp 24-59
30. Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, “The ruling System in Islam”, 5th Ed, London, Khilafah Publications,1996, p 49.
31. Wael B. hallaq, “A History of Islamic Legal Theories”, pp 15-21
32. Supra note 30, p 93
33. Wael B Hallaq, ” A history of Islamic Legal Theories”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp 14-21
34. Sami Zubaida, “Law and Power in the Islamic World”, London, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2003, pp 78-79.
35. Spinoza,Theologico-Political Treatise, translated from Latin by R.H.M. Elwes, New York, Dover Publications. 1951. p 69
36. Ahmad S. Moussalli, “The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights”, Gainseville, University Press of Florida, 2001, p 30, See also;Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, “The Ruling System in Islam”,5th Edition, London, Khilafah Publications, 1996, p 45.
37. ” O you who believe, Obey Allah, Obey His Messenger and those in authority from amongst you and if you differ then refer it to Allah and His Messenger if you believe in Allah and the Last Day”,The Qur’an 4:59.
38. Sami Zubaida, “Law and Power in the Islamic World”, London, .I.B.Tauris & Co. 2003, pp 51-56

also see, Samih Atef El-Zein, “Islam and Human Ideology”, translated by Elsayed M.H. Omran,, London and New York, Kegan Paul International, 1996, p 282.

1. Michael Cook, “Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong in Islamic Thought”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p 13
2. The Qur’an, see also Q3:110, Q3:114, Q7:157, Q9:71, Q9:112, Q22:41, Q31:17.
3. Supra note 45, p 39
4. Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, “The Ruling System in Islam”,5th Edition, London, Khilafah Publications, 1996, p 289.