“…it is not Assad and his allies alone who are benefitting from framing the uprising as a sectarian one”

However well intentioned, the gathering of a number of Islamic scholars and preachers at a conference in Cairo which addressed the conflict in Syria between 13-15 June ended up as an exercise in irresponsibility. I say this not only as a supporter of the Syrian uprising, but also as a supporter of the professed Islamic nature of many of the revolutionaries and the call to re-establish an Islamic caliphate that a section of the uprising has explicitly adopted.

The rhetoric coming out of the Cairo conference was that of sectarianism dressed up in a call to a praiseworthy Jihad. This apparently reached the level that one of the scholars involved called upon the Egyptian government to deny any Shia entry into the country due to them being “unclean.”

The idea that there is a Jihad against or with the Shia in Syria is a false one. From its start the Syrian uprising was against the oppressive security state of the secular, Arab nationalist Ba’athist regime. It happens that the regime is led and dominated by members of the Alawi community, and is considered by the Iranian regime to be a strategic ally in the Middle East (and so by extension, also of Hezbollah, a proxy for Iran in Lebanon).

Trying to paint the Syrian uprising as a sectarian struggle rather than one against an oppressive secular dictatorship plays into the hands of the Assad regime, who was the first to state that the rebellion was of a sectarian nature. The claim was originally part of the regime’s attempt to re-frame the revolution as a civil war being fought along sectarian lines, rather than it facing a nascent popular uprising. Alternatively, those against the regime across the board consistently stressed that they were not protesting along sectarian lines, and that this was a regime ploy to undermine the uprising.

Through making the discourse of the revolution one of sectarianism, the Iranians – Assad’s closest ally in the region – support his regime through an appeal to identity politics, despite the decision to stand by him being a cold geo-political calculation. By framing the uprising as being “anti-Shia” they justify their involvement among their own constituents, and via Hezbollah who have been mobilised ostensibly to protect Shia religious sites such as the tomb of Sayyida Zainab.

These claims should be understood in light of the following -

1.       The fact that the uprising was against the actions of the regime rather than the Alawi sect per se fundamentally undermines any claim of sectarianism. Ironically, if this had been a sectarian fight against the Alawi sect (which it isn’t) –in theory the mainstream Twelver Shia (as ostensibly represented by Iran) ought to unite with the “Sunni” rebellion against the regime, given that until the ascent of Hafez al-Assad in the 1970’s the view of both mainstream Sunni and Shia was that the Alawi sect fell entirely outside of Islam.

2.       The claim of Shia involvement to protect religious sites is thoroughly debunked in Toby Matthiesen’s article Syria: Inventing a Religious War, where he makes it clear that location of Sayyida Zainab only became a site of pilgrimage in the last few decades with a large tomb being built there by the Iranian government.

The basis used by the Syrian regime and its allies in Iran and Lebanon to frame the uprisings in sectarian terms is incorrect and merely a cover for political calculations, devoid of any moral imperative and everything to do with keeping Assad in power.

The only legitimate justification could be the claim that those engaged in the uprising are sectarian in nature. This may be true of individual elements, and though inexcusable some of it is an inevitable reaction in light of the overt sectarianism introduced by the regime into the struggle with its opponents, which has been reinforced by anti-Shia rhetoric largely emanating from Saudi Arabia. However, it ought to be clear that the uprising was not in origin due to the Alawi or Shia nature of the regime but as a result of anger and discontent with the secular dictatorship people in Syria have suffered under for decades.

At the same time, it is not Assad and his allies alone who are benefitting from framing the uprising as a sectarian one. Opponents of the Assad regime and proclaimed supporters of elements of the uprising like Saudi Arabia and Gulf states such as Bahrain who have significant Shia minorities also benefit. Saudi Arabia is facing numerous elements of discontent against its regime, ranging from the Shia minority in Najran to the continuous unrest regarding its treatment of political dissidents.

By creating a “sectarian war” in Syria, these regimes are able to frame their local problems in sectarian terms and mark all opposition with the same brush, distracting from their own oppressive policies and unpopularity during a period of sweeping change across the region. Far from being illegitimate regimes supported by foreign powers, the remaining motley collection of Arab monarchies can now claim to be bastions of Sunni Islam standing firm against an aggressive Shia expansion from Iran to Syria with Iraq, Bahrain and Najran in between.

Beyond the immediate region, Western media has been talking about the Syrian uprisings in sectarian terms almost since it began. This is partially due to aversion towards the Islamic flavour that has come to dominate the Syrian opposition, and the accusation that any call for an Islamic state means a call to sectarianism.

On one hand it forms part of the argument for those who are suspicious of any intervention in Syria, exemplified by Robert Fisk’s 16 June piece in The Independent that sensationally paints the conflict as the continuation of a “titanic Islamic struggle” stretching back to the death of the Prophet. This characterizes such an armed conflict as an inevitability, as opposed to being the contemporary manifestation of sectarian identity politics exacerbated in the region post Sykes-picot through the establishment of a government formed along confessional lines in Lebanon, the establishment of a sectarian national government in Iran in 1979 and the explosion of Shia-Sunni conflict in Iraq in the wake of Western occupation in 2003.

Conversely, at the same time conflation of the uprising as part of a constructed region wide sectarian conflict can be manipulated by any side wishing to get involved. Both anti and pro interventionists can make an appeal to sectarianism to bolster their positions (going into a sectarian conflict is messy versus not going in will leave the “sectarian extremists” in ascendancy).

In light of this and the very vocal announcement by Hezbollah that it is part of the conflict while helping the regime to retake the town of al-Qusayr, the conference in Cairo has not initiated the inflammatory sectarian discourse in this case. However, in its reaction – following on from Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s embracing of the sectarian cause reacting to Hezbollah’s Hasan Nasrallah – those involved in Cairo have merely fed into the line of argument that aids the regime’s cause and legitimises its narrative. At the same time, the call for individuals to fight on the basis of a sectarian war absolves the various governments who sponsor some of the scholars at the conference of any responsibility to resolve the conflict whether through concerted military involvement or otherwise.

With all the various entities and elements that benefit from framing the uprisings in Syria as sectarian in nature, both regionally and internationally, the obvious fact is that the general population both in Syria and beyond are the ones who suffer the result of this politics of sectarianism, as well as the uprising itself.

There have been several dissenting Shia voices who point out that the conflict in Syria is one against the regime and not sectarian in nature. Most notably, Ayatollah Subhi al-Tufayli (formerly secretary general of Hezbollah) stated unequivocally that the involvement of both Hezbollah and Iran in Syria was unjustified, and that far from their fighters being promised martyrdom if killed they would instead be destined for hell for supporting a regime that in his opinion was known to be killing women and children indiscriminately. Other Shia leaders have expressed similar misgivings, such as Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani who is reported to have advised Hezbollah to leave Syria immediately.

Rather than feed into the sectarian narrative pushed by both the Syrian and Saudi regimes as tools for their survival, and thus further helping to make it a self-fulfilling prophecy, the Cairo conference could theoretically have used such commentary to present a united voice against the Syrian regime. In doing so, it would have undermined the call to sectarianism while simultaneously building upon the popular discontent against the regime without sacrificing the aspirations of those engaged in the uprising.

REZA PANKHURST (@rezapankhurst) is a political scientist and historian, specialising in the Middle East and Islamic movements.  His latest book, The Inevitable Caliphate? A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to the Present, is published by Hurst and available now.

The End of Hezbollah in the ‘New’ Middle East[1]

This is our stance and obligation: we have tried to be people of sincerity and fidelity; we believe in truth and enunciate it. We defend it and sacrifice ourselves for it, even to the extent of martyrdom. [2]

The Priority of Principle

Any movement or political organization is defined by its principles. It’s very essence and identity is constituted by its distinct platform. Policies, and strategies employed by the movements are based primarily on these principles, and its socio-political outlook and philosophy. However, a movement ceases to exist as a distinct group of people with shared principles and goals when it gives up its principles and becomes pragmatic. Today Hezbollah faces an existential crisis after having subordinated its revolutionary principles for their pragmatic interests as they re insistent on supporting the despotic Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Hugo Assman referred to the ideology of the Iranian Revolution (from which Hezbollah emerged) as “the epistemological privilege of the poor” referring here as the Iranian scholar Amr G.E Sabet points out to the mustad’ afin (the oppressed). While revolution in Shi’i Islam has never been “utilitarian nor goal-oriented. It is an intrinsic value in and of itself” (Sabet). He goes on to quote Khomeini, whose advice to the Arab world puts to waste Hezbollah’s pragmatic power-hungry support for the regime “Do not wait until you attain power so that you can speak” but rather “speak and then you will have attained power”. Principles transcend historical realities and their socio-political configurations however temporary pragmatic alliances do not.

Hypocrisy and Betrayal

At the heart of Hezbollah’s manifesto is their claimed dedication to the principle of revolution against tyranny which at the core of Tawhid while citing the massacre of Karbala and Husayn radiyallahu ‘anhu against Yazid. The moral of the iconic event in Karbala being; revolution and the rejection of tyranny are principles which were given priority by Husayn radiyallahu ‘anhu who revolted with several dozen men knowing well what the material outcomes would be, but dismissing them in light of these lofty values. Ali Shariati, being a key ideologue of the Iranian Revolution remarked, in speaking of the passive and complacent Shi’ites of his time “For we all believe that it is not possible for a nation to be Muslim, to believe in Ali and his way, and yet to gain no benefit from such a belief” (Bayat 156)

Hezbollah plunged into the abyss of strategic and ideological blunder earlier this year after having openly admitted to sending its men to defend Assad’s regime against the revolution – a revolution against a secular regime, which by principal is illegitimate according to the political ideology of Hezbollah. And while Hezbollah draws its “identity” from the Husayn radiyallahu ‘anhu revolted as a result of corruption within the framework of an existing Islamic State while Assad’s draconian rule and pan-Arabist Baathist regime is based on the complete rejection of Islam as a mode of governance and is entrenched in exclusionary secular values.

Lost Principles, Failed Strategy, and an Existential Crisis

An appraisal of Hezbollah’s policies requires that we understand the grand-strategy of “Islamic” Republic of Iran. Doing so exposes both the ulterior motives of Hezbollah (and its lack of autonomy on one hand) and the strategic short-sightedness of the “Islamic” Republic of Iran. Hezbollah betrays not only its normative principles, but also its pragmatic political “aspirations” which state;

“We want Lebanon to be sovereign, free, independent, strong and competent. We want it also to be powerful, active, and present in the geopolitics of the region”[3]

Hezbollah’s manifesto goes on to condemn the United States for “Supporting the systems of dictatorship and tyranny as well as subjection in the region” yet both Hezbollah and Iran continue to provide one of the region’s largest coercive security apparatuses with monetary and military support. And while condemning the United States for “Creating and embedding sedition and divisions of all types, especially sectarian ones” the Iranian-backed militia continues to polarize the Muslim world and exacerbate sectarian divisions through its incessant support for the Syrian tyrant. All of which is done under the banner of “national unity” and “freedom, security and stability”[4]

“Resistance” and Other Pragmatic Justifications

Even if one were to entertain justifications based on Assad’s “support for the resistance” and “containment of American hegemony” a critical question emerges; does material support for armed resistance legitimize a regime? And if so, does this legitimization occur independently of the regime’s ideological foundations? A war-mongering and opportunistic United States which supported the Afghan resistance against the U.S.S.R would then also have met the criteria for legitimacy, if consistency is sought of course as would Iran’s key rival; Saudi Arabia. While claiming that their policies are directed towards the containment of American hegemony in the region ignores a blatant and explicit anti-Americanism amongst the Syrian revolutionaries and a growing chasm between the Free Syrian Army and the Western-based Syrian National Council. The hesitancy of the United States to provide nothing more than nominal support and lip-service to the revolution is indicative of such as it fails to find proxies within the Syrian revolution to lead a transition to a “Civil Democratic” Syria which will not drift too far from a U.S orbit and maintain its interests in the region. As a result, a post-Assad Syria will not be shaped nor defined by an Imperialistic U.S or a pragmatic “Islamic” Republic of Iran as both powers will be excluded from the transitory process.

Hezbollah’s reactionary policies are predicated on a false dilemma or binary: neo-Colonialism led by the neo-Liberal powers v. old-colonialism as represented by the anarchic Authoritarian Syrian regime. A third-way was not considered, leaving both Hezbollah and the United States stumbling towards a bleak future. Having abandoned their ideological foundations, and forgone their pragmatic national commitments – Hezbollah’s actions have been detrimentally informed by an illusionary dilemma. The “Islamic” Republic of Iran on the other hand has isolated itself from the Muslim world. Across the Muslim world protests were held in from of the Lebanese and Iranian embassies vehemently condemning Iran and Hezbollah.

Both in principle and strategically[5], it would have been a wiser move for Hezbollah to either by the Syrian people during their revolution or to remain neutral towards a population who can be described by the Shi’ite thinker and journalist Suroosh Irfani as those “liberation person(s)” who have “refused to submit to despotism and its attempts for distorting supreme values, and preferred death to a dehumanized purposeless existence under a monstrous regime and inhuman social system, it is a response to Hussein’s call. Whenever there is struggle for liberation, Hussein is present on the battlefield”. Despite the death of Husayn and the continuation of Yazid’s regime following the Karbaba massacre, the latter has been forgotten while Husayn remains a symbol of resistance and liberation for the centuries to come for history teaches us that a nation’s population does not come and go, while regimes do.

Syrian’s had shown their utmost support prior to Hezbollah’s betrayal while the support of the regime had always been pragmatic and the flow of weapons to the resistance in their iron-clutch which they tighten at times, and ease at others. Potentia (real power) is always located with the people, a lesson they should have learned from the Iranian revolution. More so, the Arab Spring has largely changed the dynamics of power in the Arab-Muslim world, in that, ‘the people’ as a collective body have become autonomous political actors capable of exerting their own pressure and enforcing their own will. Consequently, Hezbollah’s future in the region is bleak as it cannot strive on minorities and rural populations alone. And while the liberatory caravan of Husayn will continue to shake the thrones of tyranny across the Arab-Muslim world, Hezbollah’s caravan will find its demise in Yazid’s Damascus.

Ali Harfouch is a graduate of Political Studies at the American University of Beirut working in Islamic activism.

This Blair narrative is the political face of a much more explicit view that the United States (and by extension, the “West”) is engaged in a war with Islam, which according to Jeremy Scahill’s “Dirty Wars” was commonly held among senior figures appointed in the Rumsfield-Cheney era – such as Donald Rumsfield’s intelligence director General Boykin and the head of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) General Stanley McChrystal among others. One American officer once described Boykin’s and McChrystal’s opinion that there was a “great crusade against Islam,” justifying attacks on Muslims “because you were fighting against the Caliphate.”

However far reaching or deeply held this opinion may be (or not), such an idea of a “War on Islam” could never be explicitly endorsed due to the obvious public relations ramifications. But, by publicly claiming that Islam is a religion of peace while simultaneously asserting that “Islamism” is the problem, it is possible to avoid a conflict with “Islam” yet wage a “war of terror” against “terrorists” which has been extended to encompass the ideology of “Islamist extremism” behind the “terrorism.”

This “Islamist extremism” is nothing to do with attacking civilians, but rather as Blair put it in his recent intervention it is “a view about religion and about the interaction between religion and politics that is not compatible with pluralistic, liberal, open-minded societies.”

Or in other words, the political aspects of Islam that run contrary to Western liberal values and views of how a state should be organized.

The “Conveyor Belt to Terrorism”

The Blair narrative contends that it is these aspects of Islam that are the threat to international peace today (as opposed to engaging in wars in the Middle East on spurious grounds, or the support for dictators against their own people, or the continued abuses and atrocities committed in the name of “defending freedom.”) It states that political aspirations widely shared by Muslims such as belief in a caliphate, or the even more commonly held foreign policy grievances, are precursors to engaging in “terrorism” and that there should be no space permitted to allow any discussion with or even among Muslims of such political aspirations or grievances as legitimate through the use of exclusionary discourse. All the while, foreign policy is excused or ignored as the primary causal factor of blowback.

The narrative had become so dominant in Britain that by 2009 the British government considered plans to formalize key identifiers for “extremists” including a belief in the applicability of Sharia law in contemporary times, the concept of belonging to a single Muslim community internationally (theumma), the legitimacy in resisting armed attack and occupation through the use of force (Jihad), and the aspiration of living under an Islamic caliphate.

Following the attack on May 22 in Woolwich, the same false narrative was again thrust into the forefront of the media, with a BBC article written by one self-proclaimed “ex-extremist” stating that the four major components of “Islamism” that needed to be tackled were: the idea of caliphate, the umma, Sharia, and Jihad—all part of the same Blair narrative. The same four were then subsequently mentioned by Boris Johnson in a Telegraph article entitled “By standing united, we can isolate the virus of Islamism”  where he stated that “we need to make a hard and sharp distinction between that religion [Islam] – and the virus of ‘Islamism’” before going on to talk about the four points in negative terms. Blair’s own intervention made the more general point that there remained a problem within a “strain” of Islam.

In truth, many aspects of what are labeled elements of “Islamist extremism” form part of normative, traditional Islamic views rather than being perverted anomalies. When declaring an ongoing struggle between the “West” with “Islamist extremism,” what is meant is the conflict between Western values and views of state and those found in traditional Islamic scholarship. And in continuing to label normative Islamic viewpoints in pejorative terms while framing them as security problems and causal factors for attacks on civilians in the West, it is not surprising that more hatred and misunderstanding is created both domestically against Muslim communities settled in the west and internationally against Muslim-majority countries.

“Islamism,” Normative Islam and the Discourse of Exclusion

Each of the four points mentioned as the key identifiers of “Islamism” and “extremism” are part of centuries of normative orthodox Islamic scholarship, recognized as such in Western academia (as can be confirmed through a perusal of the 13 volume Encyclopedia of Islam published by Brill). Indeed, it is an ironic fact that according to traditional Islamic scholarship, denying the obligation of a caliphate (one of the identifiers of “extremist” thought) would be considered as the perverted, heretical view, a point I have discussed from an academic perspective in a separate short article recently.

It follows therefore that it should not be surprising that as a result of increased religiosity these ideas are widely supported by Muslims internationally. For example, the results of research carried out by University of Maryland in 2007 found that an ave­rage of 71 per cent of those interviewed across four Muslim countries (Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia and Pakistan) agreed with the goal of requiring “strict application of Sharia law in every Islamic country,” while also finding that sixty-five per cent agreed with the goal of unifying “all Islamic countries into a single state or caliphate.” Therefore, the labeling of these aspirations as “Islamist” and “extremist” also labels swaths of Muslims globally who are inspired by normative Islamic values (as well as those who carry such beliefs in the west) as “Islamist extremists.”

Since these identifiers of “Islamism” are in fact agreed upon parts of normative Islamic scholarship and widely supported by Muslims, it may be surmised that the use of the term “Islamism” is simply to identify those parts of normative Islam that are unpalatable to western liberal values or inconvenient for foreign policy. The contemporary usage of “Islamism” and “extremism” are both generally intended as pejorative terms, part of the deployment of a discourse that among other things serves to demonize opponents and intends to exclude opinions that run contrary to the interests of the political elite.

The continued use of the term “Islamist” along with “extremism” is the kind of language that the American Muslim advocacy group CAIR complained about recently, with their communications director Ibrahim Hooper writing an op-ed in January 2013 which stated that “Unfortunately, the term “Islamist” has become shorthand for “Muslims we don’t like.” It is currently used in an almost exclusively pejorative context and is often coupled with the term “extremist,” giving it an even more negative slant.”

This is a tactic which is not limited to Muslims. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has been variously referred to as a party of fruitcakes, loonies, and extremists all within the last year, before reluctantly being accepted by the liberal mainstream as “mainstream” as a result of their electoral success. Either their policies are “extremist,” in which case the British establishment is now pandering to extremism by accepting UKIP as mainstream, or they are not, which means that the label of “extremism” was simply used to try to exclude them from the political discourse, until they received such popular support that it was impossible to ignore them.

The Fallacy of the “Conveyor Belt” Theory

Internal government reports leaked to the Sunday Telegraph in 2010concluded that they “do not believe that it is accurate to regard radicalization in this country as a linear ‘conveyor belt’ moving from grievance, through radicalization, to violence”. They went on that the “thesis seems to both misread the radicalization process and to give undue weight to ideological factors.” So according to the British government’s own officials and experts, suggesting that “Islamist extremist” aspirations (which are a part of normative Islam) are a gateway to terrorism is incorrect. Hence any subsequent claims to that effect can reasonably be construed as politically disingenuous.

While the conveyor-belt theory may offer a simplistic narrative fit for popular consumption, the issues involved in such cases seldom are.

Each case has several idiosyncratic elements involved that also need to be considered. In the specific instance of Woolwich, though many details are still yet to emerge, there are claims that one of the alleged perpetrators Michael Adebolajo was tortured in Kenya in 2010 and was subsequently approached numerous times by British intelligence, while Michael Adebowale saw a friend “literally sliced to pieces” in front of him (while being stabbed himself) in 2008. This means that the role of torture, security service harassment and other traumatic experiences along with other socio-economic factors would also have to be analyzed to understand the specific mindsets and motivations of these two men. Even then, none of this proves any causality.

There are other slightly more detailed phase models that attempt to explain and help identify radicalization currently used by western police and intelligence services, such as those developed by the NYPD and Danish Security and Intelligence Services.  However, other academic research, such as a report by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, argues that these models have major substantive shortcomings, are based upon post hoc studies and make the simple methodological error of “selection on the dependent variable”, among others, which invalidates their conclusions. As the report mentions, just as it is impossible to explain why books become bestsellers by examining only bestsellers, it is impossible to explain radicalization only by cases of radicalization.

There are obvious problems with these simplistic models, which are multiplied when considering the crude contention that “non-violent extremism” leads to “violent extremism.” Drawing conclusions based on theories that suffer from this type of selection bias is extremely risky and may inadvertently substantiate  statements such as “not every Islamist extremist is a terrorist, but all Islamist extremist terrorists are Islamist extremists,” which could be considered a politically correct way of suggesting “not every Muslim is a terrorist, but all Muslim terrorists are Muslim,” particularly when it has already been shown that the identifiers of “Islamist extremism” are actually unequivocally aspects of normative Islam.

Consequences to the Blair Narrative

While both the Blair narrative and the convenient “conveyor-belt” theory may assuage the public’s need for an explanation of what lies behind such attacks—which politicians are loath to admit is linked to Western foreign policy—they only further alienate and frustrate those Muslims who have legitimate foreign policy grievances and believe in normative Islamic ideals.

Additionally, they serve to sow distrust and suspicion against Muslims among the rest of the population, exemplified by the former head of MI5 Stella Stella Rimington, who recently implied people should be spying on their neighborsin order to inform the police for any signs of “extremism.” A further example would be Cameron’s intervention in parliament on June 3, warning against extremism in mosques and Islamic seminaries (despite the fact that neither had anything to do with the Woolwich attack). The same week then witnessed more arson attacks, this time on an Islamic studies boarding school and an Islamic community center both in London—highlighting how the political discourse feeds into anti-Muslim sentiments on the ground and can lead to such results. A simple inversion of the conveyor belt theory would therefore pose many more questions of Cameron et al who hold official positions of power and influence over millions, as opposed to the accused “extremists.”

There was a reported 15-fold increase in reported attacks upon Muslims and mosques in the days after the Woolwich attack, not unsurprising given the circumstances but fed by the restatement of the same narrative—that Islam is not the “problem” but an “Islamist extremism,” which is then defined in terms of normative Islamic views and holding grievances against foreign policy. It is unlikely many people will see the proclaimed difference, and they are certainly unable to see any difference between Cameron’s “good” and “bad” Islamic seminaries and mosques.

In any case, Blair’s recent intervention indicates that he is slowly giving up the pretense that any such difference between “Islam” and “Islamism” exists stating “the world view goes deeper and wider than it is comfortable for us to admit.” By making such comments, the mask of the “Islamist extremist” narrative momentarily slipped to reveal the true meanings behind the discourse: Islam and Muslims are to blame for the blowback of a globalized war of which he was a major protagonist.

The same war without limits is today led by President Obama, who only recently was compelled to outline policy regarding drone strikes and Guantanamo bay detention center, two of the most frequently discussed grievances regarding America’s foreign policy of the moment (part of a long list including but not limited to illegal renditions, torture, indiscriminate killing and the continuing effects of the use of depleted uranium shells). Such policies are what lead commentators such as Glenn Greenwald to continuously point out that “the proximate cause of these attacks are plainly political grievances: namely, the belief that engaging in violence against aggressive western nations is the only way to deter and/or avenge western violence that kills Muslim civilians.”

As highlighted in numerous polls and obvious to any observer, grievances regarding western foreign policy in the Middle East and other Muslim countries are widespread. The recent uprisings in the region have all been against former allies in America’s “war on terror,”: Mubarak in Egypt, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Gaddafi in Libya, Saleh in Yemen and now al-Assad in Syria, all of whom were formerly collaborating with America in intelligence-sharing, renditions, and torture. Belief in an idealized global Islamic brotherhood is still cherished by Muslims despite their internal differences while aspirations for Islamic governance under Sharia law and the unification of Muslim countries are also popular and mainstream in several parts of the Muslim world.

Demonizing such grievances and aspirations may be understandable in the context of secular, liberal western democracies, especially when governments are participating as part of a seemingly never ending, expanding and self-perpetuating “war of terror.” However, such demonization is hardly conducive to community cohesion whether in a national or international context.

An alternative prudent and principled approach would be to instead start making truly concerted efforts to understand what such grievances and aspirations really mean to their advocates, rather than simply inaccurately labeling them as international security concerns while continuing to prosecute aggression seemingly without limits or oversight against others abroad in what arguably looks very much like a thinly disguised war on Islam.

This piece was original posted on Foreign Policy Journal

REZA PANKHURST is a political scientist and historian, specialising in the Middle East and Islamic movements. He has a doctorate from the London School of Economics, where he previously completed his Masters degree in the History of International Relations.

His latest book, The Inevitable Caliphate? A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to the Present, is published by Hurst and available now.

Twitter: @rezapankhurst

In the face of criticism that the war on Iraq was the root cause for the attacks of July 2005, Tony Blair admitted in 2006 that “the majority view of a large part of western opinion, certainly in Europe” was that “the policy of America since 9/11 has been a gross overreaction; George Bush is as much if not more of a threat to world peace as Osama bin Laden; and what is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere else in the Middle East, is an entirely understandable consequence of US/UK imperialism or worse, of just plain stupidity.” His alternative narrative – one that he has consistently held to subsequently – was that “religious extremism” was the root cause of terrorism. Such “extremism” was explained as “their attitude to America … their concept of governance…their positions on women and other faiths.”

In 2009 the British government considered plans which would have formalized the Blair narrative and considered ideas such as a belief in the applicability of Sharia law in contemporary times, the concept of belonging to a single Muslim community internationally (the umma), the legitimacy of resisting attack and occupation through the use of force (jihad), and the aspiration of living under an Islamic caliphate as key identifiers of “extremists.” This narrative has been consistently raised in the media by a range of “counter-extremism experts” and think-tanks, who argue that it is indeed “Islamist extremism” that leads to terrorism.

In the wake of the Woolwich attacks, the same narrative has resurfaced in the media, and was mentioned in Boris Johnson’s Daily Telegraph article entitled “By standing united, we can isolate the virus of Islamism”, in which he stated that “we need to make a hard and sharp distinction between that religion [Islam] – and the virus of ‘Islamism’ ”. He mentioned in a negative manner the same four points as being characteristic of Islamism.

Each of these contentious four points that are allegedly key identifiers of “Islamism” and “extremism” have featured for centuries in normative orthodox Islamic scholarship, and are recognised as such in Western academia. The 13 volume Encyclopaedia of Islam, published by Brill, which was compiled over several years by many of the leading Western authorities on Islamic theology and history, states in reference to the idea of a singular caliphate, that “[m]ajor points in the fully developed Sunni doctrine were the following: The establishment of an imam is permanently obligatory on the community…There can be only a single imam at any time.” Regarding the concept of umma it states that “[t]he consensus has favoured a unified umma as an ideal that transcends a particular period’s limitations and divisions”, while Jihad is explained as follows: “according to general doctrine and in historical tradition, [jihad] consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defence.”

It should surprise no one therefore that these concepts are widely supported by Muslims worldwide. The results of research carried out by University of Maryland in 2007 found that an ave­rage of 71 per cent of those interviewed across four Muslim countries (Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia and Pakistan) agreed with the goal of requiring “strict application of Sharia law in every Islamic country,” while also finding that 65 per cent agreed with the goal of unifying “all Islamic countries into a single state or caliphate.” Therefore, designating these aspirations as “Islamist” and “extremist” in effect categorises Muslims who are inspired by normative Islamic values (as well as those who carry such beliefs in the west) as “Islamist extremists.”

The continued use of the term “Islamist” along with “extremism” is symptomatic of language that the American Muslim advocacy group CAIR complained of recently.  Their communications director Ibrahim Hooper wrote in an op-ed in January 2013 that “Unfortunately, the term “Islamist” has become shorthand for “Muslims we don’t like.” It is currently used in an almost exclusively pejorative context and is often coupled with the term “extremist,” giving it an even more negative slant.”

So when Boris Johnson’s aforementioned article claims that “Islamism” is the problem “virus” that leads to terrorism, and identifies Islamism as being synonymous with these four ideas –– the caliphate, the ideal of Muslims belonging to a single community, Sharia and Jihad –– he is in fact restating in 2013 that Islam is the problem, just as he did in 2005. What has occurred in the meantime is the popularization of a discourse that labels manifestations of political Islam that are viewed as problematic, and incompatible with western secular liberalism, as “Islamism” and “Islamist extremism.”

In line with the belief that non-violent “Islamist extremism” is a conveyor belt to terrorism, on a talk show broadcast on the Sunday after the Woolwich murder, the Home Secretary Theresa May indicated that she would seek to ban “extremist groups” that do not abjure violence. Others, such as the former Home Secretary, Jack Straw, have urged caution, stating that “you have to be very careful indeed about depriving people space to utter opinions that the rest of us don’t like” and that banning extremists from TV would act as a “recruiting sergeant.”

Internal government reports leaked to the Sunday Telegraph in 2010 concluded that they “do not believe that it is accurate to regard radicalisation in this country as a linear ‘conveyor belt’ moving from grievance, through radicalisation, to violence,” and that the “thesis seems to both misread the radicalisation process and to give undue weight to ideological factors.” So according to the government’s own officials and experts, suggesting that “Islamist extremist” aspirations (which are part of normative Islam) are a gateway to terrorism is incorrect, and hence any such subsequent claims can reasonably be construed as politically disingenuous. That the perpetrators may hold these specific beliefs has not been proven to be a causal factor of violence, and such beliefs are similarly shared by millions of other Muslims globally as well as many living in the West.

While the conveyor-belt theory may offer a simplistic narrative fit for popular consumption, the issues involved in such cases seldom are. There are other more detailed models which attempt to explain and help identify radicalization, and which are used by the police and intelligence services currently, such as those developed by the NYPD and the Danish Security and Intelligence Services.  However, other academic research, such as a report by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, argues that these models have major substantive shortcomings, are based upon post hoc studies and make the simple methodological error of “selection on the dependent variable”, among others, which invalidates their conclusions. As the report mentions, just as it is impossible to explain why books become bestsellers by examining only bestsellers, it is impossible to explain radicalisation only by cases of radicalisation.

There are obvious problems with these simplistic models, which are multiplied when considering the crude contention that “non-violent extremism” leads to “violent extremism.” Drawing conclusions based on theories that suffer from this type of selection bias is extremely risky and may inadvertently substantiate  statements such as “not every Islamist extremist is a terrorist, but all Islamist extremist terrorists are Islamist extremists,” which could be considered a politically correct way of suggesting “not every Muslim is a terrorist, but all Muslim terrorists are Muslim,” particularly when it has already been shown that the identifiers of “Islamist extremism” are actually unequivocally aspects of normative Islam.

This type of narrative was popularised after 2005, notably by Michael Gove’s Celsius 7/7 and Ed Husain’s The Islamist. Unfortunately, the waves of erroneous opinions offered in the wake of the Woolwich attack by politicians, media commentators, “counter-extremism” experts and self-professed “ex-extremists” certainly do not stand up to any academic scrutiny. While both the Blair narrative and the convenient “conveyor-belt” theory may assuage the public’s need for an explanation of what lies behind such attacks –– which politicians are loath to admit is linked to Western foreign policy –– in doing so it alienates Muslims who have legitimate foreign policy grievances , as well as sowing distrust and suspicion of Muslims among the wider population (as when the former head of MI5, Stella Rimington, recently implied people should be spying on their neighbours in order to inform the police of any signs of “extremism”).

The misapplied ideology of “an eye for an eye” mentioned by one of the Woolwich killers as a justification for their act is alien to normative Islam, a misplaced reaction to legitimate grievances against Western foreign policy, something I have discussed in more detail elsewhere. Two days after the Woolwich murder, a British High Court ruled that up to 161 allegedly unlawful killings by the British military in Iraq should be the subject of  hearings by coroners. The previous day, President Barack Obama had outlined in a major speech his policy regarding drone strikes and Guantanamo Bay detention centre, two of the most frequently discussed grievances regarding America’s foreign policy of the moment. Such policies are what lead commentators such as Glenn Greenwald continuously to point out that “the proximate cause of these attacks are plainly political grievances: namely, the belief that engaging in violence against aggressive western nations is the only way to deter and/or avenge western violence that kills Muslim civilians.”

As highlighted in numerous polls and obvious to any observer, grievances regarding western foreign policy in the Middle East and other Muslim countries are widespread. The recent uprisings in the region have all been against former allies in America’s “war on terror,”: Mubarak in Egypt, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Gaddafi in Libya, Saleh in Yemen and now al-Assad in Syria, all of whom were formerly collaborating with America in intelligence-sharing, renditions and torture. Belief in an idealized global Islamic brotherhood is still cherished by Muslims despite their internal differences while aspirations for Islamic governance under Sharia law and the unification of Muslim countries are also popular and mainstream in several parts of the Muslim world.

Demonizing such grievances and aspirations may be understandable in the context of secular, liberal western democracies, though it is hardly conducive to community cohesion whether in a national or international context. It  might prudent and principled to instead begin making truly concerted efforts to understand what such grievances and aspirations really mean to their advocates, rather than simply inaccurately labelling them as security concerns.

This piece was original posted on the Hurst publisher blog

REZA PANKHURST is a political scientist and historian, specialising in the Middle East and Islamic movements. He has a doctorate from the London School of Economics, where he previously completed his Masters degree in the History of International Relations.

His latest book, The Inevitable Caliphate? A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to the Present, is published by Hurst and available now.

There are a number of questions and contentions that can be raised with such statements, ranging from the fact that all the “conveyor belt” type theories used as the basis for such assertions have been proven as academically incorrect due to several methodological and substantive shortcomings, the downplaying of the role of foreign policy as a primary causal factor of attacks carried out in the West by those inspired by Islamic belief and the use of discourse to exclude others from participation in society by labelling them with pejorative terms such as “extremism” and “Islamist.”

This article will focus upon whether the belief in the necessity of a universal caliphate is a perverted version of normative Islam tradition or not. It will be shown that far from being a modern anomaly referred to as “Islamism” or “Islamist extremism,” the belief in the obligation of establishing a caliphate is part of an overwhelming consensus in traditional Islam. Ironically, denying the obligation is in fact considered to be a perversion of Islam, a historical position limited to a small number of heretical sects.

What is meant by normative Islam are those opinions and views based upon an understanding of the Qur’an and those Prophetic traditions (sunna) which are widely held to be authentically traced back to the Prophet, supported by the opinions of historical traditional scholars whom the majority of Muslims would consider as representative of Muslim orthodoxy. If belief in the caliphate which would implement Sharia law is part of such a consensus, then obviously labelling it as “Islamist extremist” would naturally mean the labelling of any Muslim who believed in normative Islamic tradition as an “Islamist extremist.”

There are numerous verses from the Qur’an which have been used historically by Muslims as evidence that revelation is the basis of legislation, and that it is the law as ordained by God that should be used to judge between men (to give but one example among many – “But no, by your Lord, they can have no Faith, until they make you (O Muhammad) judge in all disputes between them). This led to the consensus of understanding among Muslims that in Islamic law the legislator is God, meaning that His revelation, as represented in the Qur’an and the words of His Prophet, form the basis for legislation.

For this reason, in the traditional books of the Islamic jurists who authored the science of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) there is agreement that God is the legislator (al-Hakim) and that legislation is for God alone. The difference between a system that adopts this legislation as its basis and what would be termed a theocracy in the Western sense, is that in normative Islam it is the role of scholars and rulers to discern the law from the sources of revelation, and to implement it while being held to account upon that basis by the public.

There are also numerous texts found amongst the Prophetic narrations in the books considered the most authentic in traditional Islam (the two most authentic collections considered to be Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim) which articulate that the role of the ruler is to rule by Islam. Amongst them is a well-known long narration that ends with the words “and then there will be caliphate (once again) upon the Prophetic method.” Yet another is the shorter narration “If the pledge of allegiance is given to two caliphs kill the latter of them,” one of the most common evidences used as a basis for unitary leadership being obligatory.

There are several other examples of Islamic evidences that have traditionally been used, to the point that it is considered that there is a consensus of orthodox opinion that the Muslim nation must have a single ruler who is responsible for the running of their affairs in accordance with Islamic law, something articulated in detail in books specifically on Islamic governance.

The most famous exposition of the Islamic theory of State was by Abul-Hasan al-Mawardi, who claimed that the establishment of the caliphate was an Islamic obligation which was universally agreed upon. His 11th century treatise, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya (The Rules of Governance), remains one of the major classical references for Islamic political theory. These ideas were not articulated by al-Mawardi alone. His claim of a consensus upon the obligation of the caliphate is mirrored by everyone else who wrote on the subject, including prominent authorities well known within Islamic scholarly tradition such as Mohammad bin al-Hussain al-Fara Abu Ya‘la, Abdul Qadir al-Baghdadi, Ali bin Ahmad bin Said bin Hazm al-Dhahari and Abu Abdullah Al-Qurtubi, amongst others.

This point of Islamic law is confirmed in practically every single book written on Islamic governance up until the twentieth century, all of which narrate an agreement on the obligation to establish the caliphate which goes beyond that even of orthodox scholarship, which also includes practically all of the minority sects. This is summarized by al-Dhahari – an 11th century scholar born in Cordoba – who stated “all of ahl al-Sunna, all of the murji’a, all of the Shia, and all of the Khawarij have agreed on the obligation of Imama [another term used for the caliphate], and that the Umma is obliged to appoint an Imam who will apply the rules of Allah and look after their affairs with the rules of the Shari‘a which the Messenger of Allah brought, except for some of the Khawarij [who did not agree upon the obligation of the caliphate].” Ironically, the Khawarij sect – some of whom  denied the obligation of the caliphate but were all fervent believers in ruling by Sharia law – are considered to be among the most heretical groups responsible for much of the bloodshed in the early Islamic era.

In conclusion, there is such an overwhelming consensus on the issue of the obligation of a single leadership who is responsible to rule by the law of God that any opposition has historically been rejected as an anomaly and in contradiction to normative Islam and traditional scholarship. This is something recognised in Western academia – for example in the 13 volume Encyclopaedia of Islam published by Brill compiled over several years by a number of leading Western authorities on Islamic theology and history, it states regarding the idea of a singular caliphate that “[m]ajor points in the fully developed Sunni doctrine were the following: The establishment of an imam is permanently obligatory on the community…There can be only a single imam at any time.”

Therefore it is clearly inaccurate to state the obligation to establish a caliphate is not a part of orthodox Islamic belief. Rather, according to Islamic tradition, a denial of that obligation would actually be considered a perversion of the religion.

This piece was original posted on There is Power in the Blog

REZA PANKHURST is a political scientist and historian, specialising in the Middle East and Islamic movements. He has a doctorate from the London School of Economics, where he previously completed his Masters degree in the History of International Relations.

His latest book, The Inevitable Caliphate? A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to the Present, is published by Hurst and available now.

On the 22nd of May 2013, a serving British soldier was targeted by two youths, who proceeded to kill the man with a machete and a butcher’s knife, in Woolwich, South East London. This relatively unremarkable district of the London metropolis was transformed into the hub of media activity for numerous days after the shocking act.

This was almost immediately labelled a terrorist attack and all relevant bodies, including the COBRA Committee, held emergency gatherings to discuss and assess the situation. Inevitably discussions within government and media focused on why it occurred and how to prevent such actions in the future. Sadly, rather than discussing the anger and frustration created by British foreign policy, the discussion was been diverted to resurrecting failed strategies like PREVENT or toughening police powers with the proposed introduction of the Draft Communications Data Bill.

This article will focus upon this proposed draft bill and the maneuvering taking place to capitalise on the shock and outrage in the light of the Woolwich murder. Clearly there is an agenda deployed by the political establishment to misuse people’s grief to enforce draconian legislation.

In 2008, the Labour government of Gordon Brown floated the plans of an Interception Modernisation Programme (IMP), allowing greater access to communications of the populace. In brief, plans were made to collect data on all phone calls, emails, chat room discussions and web-browsing of individuals as part of the IMP. The proposals would then be presented as part of the Communications Data Bill. Chris Huhne, the Liberal Democrat Home affairs spokesman at the time said: “The government’s Orwellian plans for a vast database of our private communications are deeply worrying.” He was not alone in his concerns. The Conservative opposition allied itself with the Liberal Democrats in voicing great concern to the creation, eventually, of a central database of communications data, much like the NSA Call Database in the USA. This idea was rejected by Jacqui Smith, the Home Secretary holding office at the time. Instead, she proposed that all communications providers store such data within their own back-up systems, making it available to the authorities when required. In effect, these proposals fulfilled the aims of the IMP, at a lower cost to the Chancery.

However, the Conservatives ascent to power in 2010 curtailed a lot of these measures, theoretically. For example, they announced that they would stop the storing of email and Internet records without ‘good reason’. Nevertheless, the proposals of the IMP were not reversed in their entirety. Rather the new coalition government decided to review communications data control through the mechanism of the Communications Capabilities Development Programme.

Evidencing the open secret that all governments sing from the same hymn sheet, the Conservatives ‘re-constructed’ the plans through a variety of propositions. The Queen’s speech, used as a platform to detail the government’s plans and strategies for the forthcoming year, made reference to the government’s intentions in this regard. She announced that the Executive wanted to “maintain capability” for the law enforcement agencies to have access to private communications traffic. This proposal was presented by Theresa May, the Home Secretary, as the Draft Communications Data Bill. She expressed hope that, after deliberation and debate, the act would become part of the law in 2014.

The propositions contained within this bill represent the stark epitome of a developing police state. The proposals would require a storing of each user’s web history, webmail access, mobile phone contacts data, online gaming records, social media usage and voice calls data. This would be in addition to the telephone contacts and email data already required to be stored. Such information would be required for access for up to 12 months. An already depleted treasury would be expected to provide up to £1.4 bn per year for such activities to be conducted, a considerable burden.

The proposals faced stern opposition from the Tory government’s coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats. In light of Nick Clegg’s opposition, the draft bill was referred to a Joint Committee to ponder and amend, making it acceptable to the masses. This was to be a difficult undertaking as 71 percent of those surveyed in a YouGov poll believed that such data would not remain secure. Further, many Internet giants including Wikipedia have already considered proposals to circumnavigate such legislation, should it become statute.

What does all of the above have to do with the killing of Lee Rigby though?

The proposed Communications Bill was dropped following a split in the coalition government. In the aftermath of the attack in South East London last week, former Conservative leader Michael Howard suggested that a Labour-Conservative pact could save the legislation from death and push through the controversial law. He suggested that David Cameron had to act in the “national interest”, following the Woolwich murder. The Shadow Home Secretary, Sadiq Khan, expressed a willingness to review the proposals of such communications legislation. Two former Labour Home Secretaries, Alan Johnson and John Reid, have also reared their political heads and placed their intellectual weight behind the proposals. Ed Miliband, the Leader of the Opposition, has provided vital support for the proposals, suggesting that Labour would support any legislation deemed necessary, should David Cameron propose the same.

The outpouring of public anger, grief, fear and resentment is being manipulated by the political class once more. Sadly, this is a wholly expected phenomena. Those established within the realms of power have always sought calculated interests from moments of adversity and high emotion. The aftermath of the September 11 attacks provides a clear example of this attitude, as do the 7/7 bombings, domestically. The draconian statutes introduced within Britain included such abhorrence as the Terrorism Act and the Extradition Act.

The current Communications Bill is an extension of such incursions into population privacy. The proposed legislation would allow for a ‘Big Brother’ styled society, a hallmark of the most repressive and morally suspect regimes in the world. In line with this, the proposed legislation has been mockingly dubbed the ‘Snooper’s Charter’. A society where one does not feel secure when discussing or communicating with others, wondering who may be ‘snooping’ on the conversation, is not a healthy place of existence. It inevitably will breach the right for ‘a private and family life’. It is hypocritical, and ironic to the umpteenth degree, that those who vilify the despots of the world for their iron grip on their societies are, consciously or otherwise, attempting to replicate the same here in Britain.

One cannot possibly throw out superlatives in promoting the ‘virtues’ of freedom of speech, so often presented as vital to the lifeblood of a society, whilst showing such blatant disdain and disregard for it. Indeed there are discussions to be had as to whether such freedoms can ever exist or are virtuous without some constraint. However, how does one posit to the public that they are free in their expression, even those that go against the basis of society, but continue to monitor all their communications? It’s an irreconcilable dichotomy.

Having detailed the above, it makes the government’s devious tone, within the current rhetoric, even more pronounced. There exists an assertion that, had the appropriate measures been in place to monitor the communication chain between the alleged offenders, the law enforcement authorities would have been in a better position to intercept and prevent the murder of Drummer Rigby. The notion is presented, and will be pushed with greater force, that this signifies the urgent necessity to monitor the online and telephone communications of individuals. One may be tempted to believe the rhetoric at first sight but could the murder have been prevented had the Communications Bill been in force? Is the government really sincere in its assertion? Not entirely. In fact, the authorities were well-acquainted with the suspects and the bill would have added no value to the law enforcement agencies’ prevention of the murder.

Michael Adebolajo, one of the suspects of the Woolwich murder, was very well-known to the authorities. BBC reports quoted Kenyan officials outlining that they had arrested Mr Adebolajo in 2010, on suspicion of being involved in alleged terrorist activities and for his alleged ties to Al-Shabbab in Somalia. The British Consulate had intervened and ensured his release from a Kenyan prison. Whatever, the merits of his arrest by the Kenyans, the British authorities were well aware of the individual and his suspected links to so-called terrorism.

Mr Adebolajo continued to attend many Islamic marches and rallies, often appearing in videos and photos directly behind one prominent Muslim figure during such events. In light of the fact that this figure and his assocaited group have been banned and targeted by the media repeatedly, it seems unfathomable that the security services did not have access to or review such footage.

Finally, and most remarkably, Mr Adebolajo was arrested approximately two months ago, on suspicion of terrorism-related activities. He was released after a short review, the authorities realising that they had arrested a man without evidence of a crime, an oft-repeated phenomenon.

Once viewed through the prism of the above information, it becomes clear that the Communications Bill would not have prevented Mr Adebolajo from committing his murder. In fact the police force already hold the power, upon the attainment of a warrant from the judiciary, to wiretap and monitor the communications of a suspect.

Therefore the draconian measures are a deliberate step towards a greater reproach into the lives of the individuals and, as displayed in the preceding paragraphs, the grief of the British people will be used as a tool to carve out political interests while distracting the public from Britain’s foreign policy that has, more than anything else, been the main cause behind anger that leads to violent reactions. Britain, with the idea of a ‘snooper’s charter’ prominent in the political discourse, is treading a dangerous path. It’s ambitions seem likely to push the country on a route towards an authoritarian police state. The bill aims to target any individual speaking or communicating in a manner that is not in line with the ideas of the power brokers.

It should be noted that under Islam and the Caliphate (Khilafah) such pervasive and intrusive powers would be strictly forbidden. Islam prohibits the monitoring, as proposed in this bill, of the individual thus preserving their private and family life away from the prying eyes of the state.

The Prophet Muhammad (saw) stated, “And do not spy and do not probe (into others affairs)” Bukhari

The prohibition is not only of an individual nature but also forbids governments from engaging in the spying on individuals’ affairs. Therefore Islam prohibits such draconian legislation, where citizens’ views are monitored by the state. As already stated, this becomes one of the defining features of a police state.

To conclude, the manner in which this draft bill is being presented, in the aftermath of the Woolwich killing, paints a picture that with this legislation police would have had the powers to stop the killing of Drummer Rigby. However as detailed in the preceding discourse this, almost certainly, wouldn’t have been the case. Rather, not only has this been a convenient distraction from any debate over British foreign policy as a source of anger and frustration, it also provides extensive powers to the police and state to monitor its citizens. This should be of great concern to every rational mind.

Adnan Khan completed his Bar studies in 2011 and currently works within the legal field.

The war on terror continues to be the most important and polarizing debate in Pakistan. Yet, it continues to this day with the most fundamental question still unanswered, is it our war or not? Although since the start of this war, Pakistani public has consistently rejected it as an American war, a section of the Pakistani intelligentsia has been consistently trying to change the overwhelming consensus against this war so as to change public opinion in favor of it. With the idea of peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban doing the rounds, a fresh attempt is being made by this segment of the intelligentsia to establish a narrative which favors military operations and continual war against Islamic militants. Arguments like protecting the monopoly of the state on physical aggression and deploying state power to defend the idea of democracy are being presented to present this war, as a just war. What follows is the rebuttal of such a narrative.

It should be understood that the state and its institutions are in origin political institutions, which are based on a comprehensive idea about the organization of the society. The legitimacy of the state does not merely come from it being the competent authority and hence enjoying complete monopoly on physical aggression. The legitimacy of a state and its institutions come from the idea upon which it stands and its ability to organize the people’s affairs successfully based on that idea. A state which is unresponsive to the needs and demands of a segment of the society would naturally face a challenge to its authority from that particular segment. In such a scenario the state needs to first and foremost review as to why a segment of the society chose to physically challenge it .This essentially means that the state should accept its failure to integrate that segment in to mainstream society. So why was that segment marginalized? Is it because of weak state infrastructure which was unable to cater for the needs of that segment of society denying it access to the resources of the state? Or was it the state’s refusal to protect that segment from foreign aggression? Is it because a new idea has taken root in that segment of the society which contradicts the idea on which the state stands? Is it because the state deliberately chose to ignore the aspirations of that segment of the society for the sake of foreign interests? Such a detailed analysis needs to be carried out by the state to win the hearts and mind of the rebellious segment of the state.

Any physical aggression aimed at the state, from within a segment of the society over which it governs, has political origins and political motivations. It is known throughout history that rebellions take route upon an agenda or an idea. The fact that such physical aggression was aimed at a political entity, the state, which has its own idea and agenda, goes on to show the political nature of such physical aggression. Faced with such a scenario, is the state justified in blind use of force as retaliation to such a physical aggression insisting that its monopoly on physical aggression be accepted at all costs whatever the political considerations? Not necessarily so. The state can deploy its extraordinary power to suppress a physical challenge to its authority, but such a power cannot transform the rebellious segment of the society, it may rather incite it further. Rebellions are not suppressed or quelled by force rather the motivations behind them should be addressed through political discourse and engagement. Ignoring the political dimension of sedition and treason is a flawed approach.

Thus, a state will only be able to subdue a rebellious segment under its authority if it is materially and intellectually superior to it. Material strength alone is not enough unless of course the state plans to physically eliminate the whole rebellious segment. A political solution is an attempt to integrate the rebellious segment of the society in to mainstream society under the authority of the state. What this really means is an attempt at integrating the rebellious segment of the society through either of the two approaches. Either the state would have to reform itself to accommodate the demands of the rebellious segment of the society or the rebellious segment would have to give up its demands. So in reality a political solution is an attempt at intellectual integration.

To suggest that such negotiations are an abdication of the state’s monopoly on physical aggression is in reality oversimplification of the problem. The state does not exist to jealously guard its monopoly on physical aggression; it rather seeks such an exclusive monopoly on physical aggression to use it in the interests of the people it governs, not to use it against them. So this is not really a debate about how institutions function, for such a debate is academic. It is rather a debate about how a political entity functions.

The liberals have previously used the institutional argument to oppose the Taliban militancy and they use it still. The idea that a state should insist on its monopoly on physical aggression, or what is more commonly referred to as the writ of the state emanates from a viewpoint which views the state as an institution which is a function of predefined set of principles based on a historical analysis of state behavior. Such an approach towards the conception of a state’s behavior often results in its proponents divorcing the institution of the state from its real function. It is an institution which derives its legitimacy from the people and hence exists to look after their affairs. An executive authority which does not enjoy legitimacy with a section of the population within its domain should act to establish its legitimacy because it cannot function without such legitimacy. What it means is that state need to be compassionate, not ruthless, in its response towards a crisis or a challenge to its authority and legitimacy. Interestingly liberals argue on similar lines with regards to the Baloch insurgency which they see as secular and nationalist, but do not believe in applying this approach towards the Taliban insurgency which they revile as having Islamic origins.

Recently the liberals have attempted to bring the ideological angle to this debate. The argument is that the Pakistani state is built on democratic principles and the ideals of secularism. As the Taliban oppose these ideals, state power should be deployed against them to defend the idea on which the state is built. Moreover as the Taliban are not willing to accept a democratic state and adopt secularism, no political reconciliation with them should even be attempted.

There are three fundamental problems with this viewpoint. Firstly and the most worrying is the vagueness in the liberal narrative, its objective and its seriousness in addressing the problem of an insurgency. It appears that such a narrative is being developed to keep liberal thought relevant in Pakistan by packaging it as an alternative to the Taliban’s version of Pakistan. As the Muslim World as a whole has marched towards Islamic revival and demanded a more prominent rather central role of Islam in politics and has in fact started demanding political institutions as envisioned by Islam, liberals have felt increasingly marginalized and irrelevant within Muslim societies. It is clear that the Muslim World has rejected secularism with surveys and polls pointing to the increasing demand of Shariah law, such as the recent Pew survey. Even the recent Pakistani elections brought right leaning parties to the fore and despite liberal arguments to the contrary these elections only serve to prove further the society’s march towards Islam. The Taliban phenomenon has given the liberals an opportunity to make liberalism relevant to the Pakistani society. So they have worked hard to build a binary narrative of Taliban versus liberalism in the hope that they would be successful in inciting the population against some practices of the Taliban and as an alternative sell liberalism and democracy to them. So the liberals are relying not on the strengths of secular democracy but the fear of the Taliban to sell their ideology. It can be argued that the liberals need the Taliban and they are not actually interested in ending the cycle of physical aggression, they are rather interested in using this physical aggression to build a narrative which can help transform Pakistan in to a secular state. So the question which needs to be asked is whether the liberals are actually interested in addressing the insurgency problem or using it for their ideological needs?

Secondly, employing state power in defense of an idea has only real meaning and effectiveness if the masses support that idea. The Pakistani public at large does not support secularism and democracy and it rather wants Pakistan to be an Islamic state. The contention that their participation in the recent elections is an expression of their support for secular democracy is deliberately trying to twist the argument. The Pakistani electorate at large doesn’t see the electoral exercise and secularism as being one and the same; they rather see no contradiction between elections under democracy and the demand for Shariah law. For them the two can go side by side. Moreover their participation in the system does not come from their conviction in democracy and the idea of sovereignty of the masses; they rather see these elections in terms of personalities and not a comprehensive system of governance. Moreover the voting patterns in recent elections were inspired by a fear of what more harm democracy could bring, rather than a loyalty and conviction in democracy. This translated in to a drive to vote based on voting for the lesser evil or the smaller thief.

The idea that Islam should be the basis of the governance model in Pakistan has been the founding idea of the Pakistani state and has continued to enjoy support within the society since then. Although the conception of an Islamic state has developed from the early years of a pragmatic struggling for a democratic Islamic state to a comprehensive and radical vision of establishing the Islamic caliphate, the idea of Islam playing a central role in politics never lost its centrality in the Pakistani society. So how can the liberals argue for deployment of state power to protect the idea of democracy, when that very idea is being challenged politically and intellectually throughout Pakistan? Are the liberals any different from the Taliban if they try to impose their idea of the state on the society through the use of force? The only difference between the two being that one is using the resources of a group, the other the resources of the state. The argument that the institution of the state is generally considered to be legitimate and hence any exercise of power in the name of the state is legitimate does not apply here. We have had regimes in Pakistan which were considered to be illegitimate by the liberals themselves, like the Zia regime. In fact the liberals have attacked Zia for using state power to defend and propagate Islam or a version of it. How can they then be justified in advocating the use of state power to defend democracy and secularism which is after all a political idea? So the argument that Taliban don’t subscribe to democracy and hence should be crushed is a flawed argument, it is flawed because the question of the idea of Pakistan has not been settled. Or to be more accurate, it has been settled at the level of the masses who want Pakistan to be an Islamic state, but it is still unsettled at the state level where a select liberal minority is using state power to resist the demands of the society.

Thirdly, and most importantly of all, the liberal narrative is flawed in its entirety because they have based it on the wrong premise. The Taliban phenomenon is not about Islamic militants wanting to overthrow the state to impose their version of Islam on the society. It is rather a rejection of Pakistan’s pro-American foreign policy in which the Pakistani state is trying to protect foreign interests by deploying material force to stop Islamic militants from going to Afghanistan to fight the American occupation. Restlessness in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt is directly associated to geopolitics. This is because in origin this war started for purely geopolitical reasons when the Pakistani regime led by Pervez Musharaf sided with America. It was argued by the Musharaf regime that not siding with America would result in the destruction of Pakistan at the hands of the US. Although Musharaf’s assessment was disputed by some as based on his pro American leanings rather than actual geopolitical reasons the absence of the argument that Islamic militants are planning to overthrow the Pakistani state was quite obvious.

Moreover the international narrative on the war on terror within Pakistan is also overwhelmingly geopolitical. The West has accused Pakistan for providing safe havens to Islamic militants in FATA who use these havens as a launching pad to challenge the American occupation in Afghanistan. The accompanying debate about violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty by US drones and attacks on Salala and Abottabad, the continuation of NATO supply line through Pakistan, American financing for Pakistan’s war efforts and the arrest of American spies in Pakistan point to a direct American link to this War within Pakistan so much so that American policy makers consider the Afghan and Pakistan territories as a joint War Theatre. The US has a direct interest in ensuring that Islamic militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas do not target its forces in Afghanistan and rather clash with Pakistan’s security forces resulting in continuation of its presence in the region without any major threats to it. It has therefore ignited the war between Islamic militants and Pakistan both physically as well as intellectually and has supported the development of a narrative in Pakistan where the War on Terror is seen as Pakistan’s war, for such a narrative helps her strategic objective.

The direct US support for this war within Pakistan makes a strong case for the War on Terror to be viewed in geopolitical terms. Even in the intellectual debate regarding this War the US has involved itself by funding political forces like the Sunni Itehad Council which openly opposed the Taliban. Therefore anyone who is serious in ending the chaos and anarchy which has gripped Pakistan in the last decade should forcefully argue for the termination of this war by challenging the main source behind it, the US presence in the region. Nothing else will end the cycle of chaos and anarchy.

The author is a freelance columnist who regularly writes on Muslim Affairs and tweets @moezmobeen

On the Telegraph website there is a piece by one Alan Judd entitled “How to spot a terrorist living in your neighbourhood.” Even though it came soon after comments made in the same paper attributed to former head of MI5 Dame Stella Rimington which encouraged people to “spy on their neighbours,” I decided to read it half-thinking it may be some kind of spoof given the ludicrously alarmist nature of Rimington’s comment in the first place.

I was being naïve. The piece can be added to a string of idiotic commentary made in the aftermath of the murder in Woolwich last Wednesday. This has included an assortment of various politicians, commentators, “counter-extremism experts” and self-described “ex-extremists” coming out and labelling traditional Islamic beliefs and moral values that run counter to liberalism as “Islamism” or “Islamist extremism,” and then basically suggesting that someone is more susceptible to killing civilians (or off-duty military personnel) if they held such ideas.

Obviously when you label so many people as potential terrorists, you need to be vigilant against them – as Rimington suggested.  You might have thought Remington made the comments having been called in as the ex-head of MI5 to give some advice to the government, but they were actually said at a literary festival where she was promoting her new spy novel. And so now another spy novel author Alan Judd has stepped up to write a piece all about how to identify these problem characters, and what to do when you have found one. He is a former soldier and diplomat who also moonlights as a security analyst when not writing spy stories (his latest book is mentioned at the bottom of his piece). According to Judd, telltale signs include asking for a prayer room, keep fit, wearing Arab clothes, not wearing Arab clothes after wearing Arab clothes, becoming more socially conservative and being vague about where you are going on holiday. You just can’t make this stuff up.

In light of all the discussion about how to identify “extremists” who are potential “violent extremists,” it could be considered equally if not more important that we also do our bit to help identify the extremism of secular fascist bigots. This is because secular fascist bigots may be susceptible to becoming violent secular fascist bigots who appear to relish anti-Muslim violence in lands far away by supporting and/ or excusing invasions on false pretenses, drone strikes or other similar imperial policies. They may also help radicalise others into becoming local violent secular fascist bigots. So here are a few of the identifiers of their mindset that that can help in to identify them:

1. They consider any Muslim that has grievances against foreign policy as suspicious.
2. They consider any Muslim who voices their grievances against foreign policy as an “extremist” unless he first praises the British army and the fine job they are doing in Afghanistan.
3. They consider any non-Muslim that thinks Muslims have legitimate grievances against foreign policy to be a liberal idiot and unwitting terrorist supporter.
4. They expect or demand that Muslims should condemn and apologise for every crime committed by other Muslims which they had nothing to do with as a recognition of collective guilt.
5. They begin labelling aspects of normative Islamic belief that have been held by Muslims for centuries such as Sharia law and the caliphate as “Islamism,” “extremism” or perhaps even “mumbo jumbo.”
6. They demand Muslim community leaders do more to help them spread 1-5 above.
7. A few may claim to be Muslim “ex-Islamists” who now understand Islam properly and help spread 1-6 above.
8. They find long beards, hijabs, niqabs, cultural clothing and Islamic moral codes deeply offensive.
9. They ask you where you have been on holiday (ok – I admit I made this last one up).

These are some of the identifiers that could indicate that the person has the extremism mindset of a secular fascist bigot. Their leaders are generally found in the neighbourhood of the mainstream media in the areas inhabited by politicians, so-called “counter-extremism experts” and “ex-Islamists” who can serve as secular fascist bigot radicalisers. Of course, someone could manifest many or even all these characteristics and more – for all manner of reasons – without becoming a violent secular fascist bigot. But its best to be safe.

UPDATE 1: If anyone radicalised by the secular fascist bigots happens to turn up at your house or near your mosque, its been proven that the best course of action is to invite them in for tea and a game of football.

UPDATE 2: Read the latest piece by Seamus Milne “Britain’s wars fuel terror. Denying it only feeds Islamophobia.”

What a crazy week it’s been and a particularly testing one for the British Muslim community. The buzzwords ‘Islamic extremists’ and ‘Muslim terrorists’ returned with a vengeance in the wake of the Woolwich tragedy and suddenly, we think we’ve identified the monster in our midst and why that monster is seething with resentment towards ordinary Britons.

But it’s not quite as black and white as some terrorist experts would have us believe. Yes, terrorism is a multilayered phenomenon, but that’s no excuse for limiting our inquiries into its most important causes. And that’s exactly what our ivory tower experts and Muslim spokespersons have been guilty of. The Muslim Council of Britain led a delegation of leaders to strongly condemn the sickening murder which it clearly was, but muted any mention of our country’s meddling in Afghanistan. On BBC Question Time, Majid Nawaz said the primary cause of terrorism was an ‘Islamist narrative’ and reserved scant mention for Britain’s foreign policy, thus displaying a remarkable lack of foresight for a co-director of the world’s first counter-extremist think tank. Newsnight felt pitting Anjem Choudary on a collision course with two mainstream Muslims would help shine the light on the moderate-extremist divide. Minister after academic after journalist all shared in the spoils to unpack the psychology of radicals and enlighten panic-struck Britons. Some said these terrorists came from socially excluded and economically marginalised backgrounds. Others said they were lone wolf foot soldiers at the mercy of Salafi Jihadism. Yasmin Alibhai Brown’s point of ‘noxious masculinity’ was a particularly amusing contribution to the debate.

But we can’t keep wrecking our brains over these mass produced explanations. As economically deprived as some British Muslims may be, it does little to help us appreciate the depth of their dissatisfaction. After all, many studies reveal that terrorists do not emerge from the lowest socio-economic strata but come from educated and affluent backgrounds. The number of suspected terrorists who have been described by their peers as friendly and popular socialites should makes us think twice before labelling radicals as misfits who have problems integrating with the wider society. My own studies and conclusions on the political grievances of young British Muslims suggest the government’s prescriptive focus on ‘suspect communities’ seduced by Jihadi propaganda occurs to a far lesser degree than is often acknowledged. Any calculating use of theology or “Islamist narrative” to justify violence was in the first place, born of political anger.

All these explanations either miss the point completely or regurgitate the misguided obsession with security, policing, and intelligence. It’s this kind of logic which makes combating terrorism baffling and obscures more patent failures at government, academic and media levels.

With a few notable exceptions, why didn’t the foreign policy of our government get the workout from all those who took to the media? Why did Muslims cower behind the state-centric assumption that terrorists derive legitimacy and justification from a warped understanding of Islam? Why did the Imam of London’s Central Mosque sound like an official from a counter-extremist watchdog doing the government’s bidding during the Friday sermon, instead of highlighting what makes the blood boil for so many Muslims at grass roots levels? Was it that, by exposing Britain’s war crimes, we would somehow be granting Michael Adebolajo a respectful hearing as some have suggested? Rubbish. Nobody wants to see a repeat of the cold-blooded murder that took place last week, so it’s more urgent than ever before that we act upon the testimonies of terrorists. Doing so would not be ceding to their demands but doing what’s in the national interest to prevent us sleepwalking into another bloody tragedy. The 7/7 bombers, the Boston bombers and the Woolwich duo have a common grievance which unites them all. And for the danger of repeating myself the umpteenth time, that grievance is the foreign policy of countries like Britain and the US which have left hundreds of thousands of Muslim men, women and children dead.

Like the overwhelming majority of British Muslims, I am also angered and distressed by what’s happening abroad but can appreciate the political space and opportunities for dissent this country has to offer to channel those grievances. But as the director of Ebrahim College Sheikh Shams ad-Duha warned the Deputy Prime Minister this week, there will always be a handful for whom civil disobedience doesn’t register well. And that’s where the debate on radicalisation needs to be centred. Britain’s military adventures abroad are clouding the religious convictions of some Muslims, who may entertain twisted understandings of scripture and grow sympathetic to the terrorist cause to express their political frustrations. The more we try to de-radicalise these individuals through community outreach, counter-extremist workshops and legislation like the snooper’s charter, the further we move from what causes their alienation. After last week’s tragedy, it’s our collective obligation to prize substance over rhetoric. This means placing the debate on terrorism in its right context and not de-politicising the discussion by pretending foreign policy does not matter.